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Abstract
This article analyzes the impact of the unconventional monetary policies (UMPs) of four 
major central banks (the Fed, ECB, BoE and BOJ) on the probability of future market 
crashes. We exploit the heterogeneity of different UMP actions to disentangle their 
infl uence on reducing the ex ante perception of extreme events (tail risks) using the 
information contained in risk-neutral densities from the most liquid stock index options. 
The empirical fi ndings show that the announcement of UMPs reduces the risk-neutral 
probability of extreme events across various horizons and thresholds, supporting the 
hypothesis of the risk-taking channel. Interestingly, foreign UMP actions also prove to 
be signifi cant variables affecting domestic tail risks, mainly at longer horizons. These 
results reveal a cross-border effect of foreign UMPs on domestic tail risks. Finally, the 
dynamics of the UMPs are captured by a structural model that confi rms a transitory 
impact of UMPs on market tail risk perceptions.
Keywords: unconventional monetary policy, risk-neutral density, tail risk, event study, SVAR.
JEL classifi cation: E44, E58, G01, G10, G14.
Resumen
Este documento evalúa el impacto de los anuncios de medidas de política monetaria 
no convencionales de cuatro grandes bancos centrales (la Reserva Federal, el Banco 
Central Europeo, el Banco de Inglaterra y el Banco de Japón) sobre las probabilidades de 
futuras caídas bursátiles. Estas percepciones de eventos extremos o riesgos de cola se 
extraen utilizando la información contenida en las densidades neutrales al riesgo de las 
opciones de los índices bursátiles más líquidos. Las conclusiones empíricas sugieren que 
el anuncio de medidas monetarias no convencionales reduce la probabilidad de eventos 
extremos a diferentes vencimientos y umbrales de riesgo, apoyando la existencia del canal 
de asunción de riesgos (risk-taking channel). Asimismo, los efectos de desbordamiento 
de medidas no convencionales sobre los riesgos de cola son relevantes, en particular 
a vencimientos a más largo plazo. Por último, un modelo estructural, que captura la 
dinámica de las medidas no convencionales de política monetaria, confi rma el impacto 
transitorio de dichas medidas sobre las percepciones de riesgo de cola.
Palabras clave: política monetaria no convencional, densidades neutrales al riesgo, 
riesgo de cola, eventos extremos, VAR.
Códigos JEL: E44, E58, G01, G10, G14.
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1. Introduction
Central banks of major economies enacted a wide array of unconventional policy mea-
sures (UMPs) to influence monetary and financial conditions. Originally implemented by
the Bank of Japan (BoJ) in 2001 to address the country’s persistent deflation and bank-
ing crisis, UMPs were eventually adopted in other countries in the aftermath of the global
financial crisis with the objective, among others, of reducing market uncertainty. These
“nonstandard” measures go far beyond conventional monetary policy and include balance
sheet policies, forward guidance and even negative interest rates. The existing variety of
UMP actions and countries constitutes a valuable source of heterogeneity for analyzing
the potential of unconventional policies. Is there a collection of UMP measures that were
systematically effective at reducing market uncertainty? Did they exhibit a similar influ-
ence in all regions? How successful have they been at lowering the probability of extreme
events? Understanding the impact of UMPs is essential to identify the influence of central
banks on financial markets, especially during distressed periods such as the past finan-
cial crisis or the recent Covid-19 pandemic, where UMPs are the first economic measures
implemented in many countries.
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the effectiveness of diverse UMP actions at reduc-
ing the perception of extreme market movements, or tail risks. In particular, we exploit
the available heterogeneity of UMP measures from four major central banks – the Fed-
eral Reserve (Fed), European Central Bank (ECB), Bank of England (BOE) and Bank of
Japan (BoJ) – to discern their impact on the risk-neutral probability of market crashes.
These anticipated probabilities of extreme events are measured through the information
contained in the risk-neutral densities (RNDs) of option prices from the main stock mar-
ket indexes. Contrary to the real-world probability densities, which refer to the dynamics
of actual prices based on historical data, option prices are forward looking because their
payoffs depend on future states of the underlying asset. The indexes selected for analysis
are the most representative, liquid and diversified in the various economies considered in
this article; therefore, the future states of the indexes are related to the future states of the
economy. Risk-neutral probabilities incorporate the subjective probability of occurrence
of a state and the risk aversion adjustment of investor preferences.
The implications of using risk-neutral probabilities of extreme events are more pro-
found than they may appear at first glance: an infinitesimal area of the RND at a given
(expected) return is directly related to the price of an Arrow-Debreu asset providing a
positive payoff in this particular state of nature. Thus, an increase in the size of this
area reflects the interest of investors to hedging this particular scenario. The methodol-
ogy employed in this article permits the measurement of the changes in the RNDs – and,
consequently, the value of Arrow-Debreu assets – before and after UMPs are announced,
providing a complete picture of the hedging demand of investors during central bank in-
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terventions. The foundations of RNDs were settled by Breeden and Litzenberger (1978)
and employed in, for instance, Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004) and Hattori, Schrimpf and
Sushko (2016). Recently, Martin (2017) and Martin and Wagner (2019) have revitalized
the literature on using option prices as estimates of expected returns.
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. First, we dig deeper into the variety
of UMP measures implemented by central banks. Our work is innovative not only in
examining the heterogeneous UMP actions pursued by various central banks but also in
analyzing the effectiveness of comparable announcements at reducing market uncertainty
(tail risk hereafter), measured by the risk-neutral probability of tail events. In this way,
we shed light on how investors react to similar UMP attempts implemented by central
banks in different countries; see, for instance, Hattori et al. (2016). The monitoring of
tail risks is key from a policy perspective. In high-volatility scenarios, it is essential to
reduce uncertainty to avoid adverse feedback loops between the financial system and the
real economy.1
Our main empirical finding suggests that UMP announcements mitigate the probabil-
ity of (expected) sharp market declines for various thresholds of a given loss and across
different horizons in the four areas analyzed. Specifically, UMP measures reduce the per-
ception of extreme events by 14 percent in the U.S, 9 percent in the euro area, 10 percent
in the UK, and 7 percent in Japan. An interesting heterogeneity is found when compar-
ing the measures. The most effective measures seem to be the announcement of forward
guidance, particularly in the US and Japan (where it reduces tail risk perceptions by 27
%) and liquidity announcements. These results highlight the relevance of communica-
tion and credibility of central banks as a monetary policy tool. According to our results,
unsterilized measures are also more effective than sterilized interventions. To the best of
our knowledge, this is the first attempt at comparing the effectiveness of the heterogeneous
measures of the four major central banks at reducing extreme market movement. However,
one needs to be cautious when comparing these disaggregated results across different ar-
eas. A concerning fact is that different types of measures are announced on the same day
and the overall number of announcements of the different measures is limited and some-
times uneven across the four central banks, making it difficult to disentangle the relative
effectiveness of different UMP measures. Additionally, the timing and the circumstances
in which they were announced, such as the underlying financial and economic conditions,
may play a relevant role. Finally, these results do not incorporate the effects of more recent
announcements of unconventional monetary policies in the wake of the COVID-19 crisis
(such as the pandemic emergency purchase programme (PEPP) in the case of the ECB or
the resumption of asset purchases of the Fed).
1As O. Blanchard notes, “So what are policymakers to do? First and foremost, reduce uncertainty. Do so
by removing tail risks, and the perception of tail risks.”, The Economist, January 31, 2009.
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A second contribution of this article is the testing of cross-border effects arising from
the nonconventional monetary policy actions of foreign central banks. The comprehen-
sive dataset employed in this paper, consisting of option prices from the most liquid stock
indexes around the world, places us in a privileged position for analyzing this issue. The
empirical evidence provided here demonstrates the role of the Fed in increasing the per-
ception of risk for overseas investors when contractionary measures are suggested. The
announcement of contractionary UMPs in the US increases tail risk perceptions in other
areas – mainly the euro area and UK – but their effects appear in the long term, suggesting
the existence of a term structure of UMPs’ impacts on tail risks.
To further provide evidence of the impact of UMPs on tail risks, we carry out a struc-
tural vector-autoregressive (SVAR) analysis. The SVAR confirms the main result of this
article: expansionary UMP shocks reduce tail risk perceptions in the four areas under
study, leading to a decrease of approximately two percentage points. However, the UMP
shock has only a temporary effect on tail risk perceptions, fading out after a year. As
an additional output of the model, the macroeconomic impact of an expansionary UMP
is found to be positive. All these results are corroborated with an exhaustive battery of
robustness checks that corroborate our main findings.
The methodology employed in this paper relies on two main sources of information:
UMP announcements by central banks and data from financial markets. On the one hand,
a comprehensive database tracking the UMP actions of different central banks has been
built for our research. This dataset comprises more than 160 events for the four major
central banks (the FED, ECB, BoE and BOJ), and it distinguishes among types of mea-
sures: liquidity, forward guidance and asset purchases (both sterilized and unsterilized). In
our view, each of these groups has a different goal, and their effect on financial variables
and market expectations deserves a particular analysis. On the other hand, the information
about RNDs is extracted from equity options written on the most liquid and representa-
tive stock indexes of each economic region: S&P500 (US), the EuroStoxx50 (Eurozone),
FTSE100 (UK) and Nikkei225 (Japan).
Thus, this article analyzes the effects of UMPs on market uncertainty using the in-
formation of future states of the economy embedded in broad index option prices. The
remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the contribution of this
article to the literature. Section 3 explains the methodology used to extract risk-neutral
densities and their estimation. Section 4 develops the static event-study analysis. The
dynamic effects of UMPs using a SVAR approach are reported in Section 5. Section 6
performs a series of robustness checks. Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper.
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2. Contribution to the literature
The development of unconventional policy measures has expanded the transmission
mechanisms of monetary policy to new channels broadly analyzed by the literature, such
as the liquidity, signaling and portfolio rebalancing channels.2 This article examines a
broader transmission mechanism of monetary policy: the risk-taking channel, in which
monetary policy actions can affect other assets and markets via their impact on risk per-
ceptions and financial sector risk-taking; see Borio and Zhu (2012) and Bruno and Shin
(2015). Specifically, we focus on the impact of UMP announcements on tail risk percep-
tions in representative market equity indexes. In this way, we contribute by testing the
transmission mechanism of Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2013), who suggest that central
bank purchases can serve as insurance against tail events.
This paper is related to different lines of the burgeoning research on the effects of
UMPs. First, this article belongs to the stream of literature analyzing the relationship be-
tween monetary policy and financial markets and, specifically, its interaction with market
uncertainty. Concerning conventional monetary policies, Birru and Figlewski (2010) find
that these types of measures are associated with “greater resolution of uncertainty”. Nave
and Ruiz (2015) confirm that an expansionary monetary policy of the ECB reduces risk
aversion in Eurozone financial markets. Maio (2014) also studies the effect of monetary
policy actions on the cross-section of equity returns, concluding that the impact of monthly
changes in the Federal funds rate is greater for the returns of more financially constrained
stocks. Rompolis (2017), using a SVAR strategy, concludes that an expansionary ECB
balance sheet shock decreases both risk aversion and uncertainty at least in the medium
term. Finally, Bekaert, Hoerova and Duca (2013) propose a decomposition of the VIX
index into its risk aversion and uncertainty constituents, showing that expansionary mone-
tary policy significantly reduces these two components. In contrast to the methodology of
Bekaert et al. (2013), we employ the full information provided by the RNDs and focus on
tail risks.
The interaction of UMPs and financial market uncertainty is a field that has expe-
rienced increasing interest in recent years, and it has mainly focused on fixed income
markets. For instance, Gagnon, Raskin, Remache, Sack et al. (2011) is one of the ear-
liest event studies with US data reporting how LSAP announcements reduce long term
yields; see also Meyer and Bomfim (2010) and D’Amico and King (2013). Similar con-
2Within the liquidity channel, UMPs can affect portfolio decisions and asset prices by altering the liq-
uidity premia. Large-scale asset purchases are credited as increased reserves on the balance sheets of private
banks. Since such reserves are more easily traded in secondary markets than long-term securities, there is a
decline in the liquidity premium, enabling liquidity-constrained banks to extend credit to investors. The sig-
naling channel highlights that UMP announcements may reveal to market participants that the central bank
has changed its view on future economic conditions, for instance that it plans to hold policy rates lower than
previously expected. On the other hand, the portfolio rebalancing channel, or QE, involves the purchase of
long-term assets, reducing the term premium and increasing the demand for risky assets.
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clusions are obtained by Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Vissing-Jorgensen (2018) for the ECB
and Joyce, Tong and Woods (2011) for the Bank of England. Bauer, Rudebusch and Wu
(2014) conclude that changes in expected short rates are also associated with changes in
the term premia of long-term rates, and Meaning and Zhu (2011) document decreasing
marginal effects of UMP on long yields. Articles examining the impact of UMPs on mar-
ket uncertainty using information from the option markets are even scarcer. For instance,
Olijslagers, Petersen, de Vette and vanWijnbergen (2019) find that only UMPs that change
the relative asset supplies seem to reduce perceived crash risks using information from op-
tion prices for the euro-dollar exchange rate. Our article is closely related to Hattori et al.
(2016), who quantify the impact of the UMPs of the Fed in RNDs from stock and bond
market options. These authors find that “nonstandard” announcements reduce the risk-
neutral implied probability of extreme events affecting interest rates and equity markets.
This article extends their study to other economic areas, comparing the effectiveness of
UMPs from the four major central banks and accounting for the heterogeneity of the dif-
ferent UMP actions.
Second, this article also belongs to another strand of literature interested in the po-
tential spillovers of monetary policy. Empirical work has mainly focused on the global
monetary spillovers of the Fed’s actions, concluding that US monetary policy has sizable
spillover effects on both advanced and emerging economies.3 For instance, Fratzscher,
Lo Duca and Straub (2018) highlight the procyclicality of flows in the wake of UMP, in
particular in emerging economies. Chen et al. (2016) also find that the effects of Fed’s
quantitative easing are even larger and more heterogeneous in emerging economies than
in advanced countries. Related papers have dug deeper into the so-called global financial
cycle. Rey (2015) and Miranda-Agrippino and Rey (2018) suggest that there is a com-
mon comovement in asset prices, capital flows and credit growth that seems to be driven
by monetary conditions in core economies, particularly the US, affecting domestic policy
makers’ decisions and risk aversion. Some papers have also compared the spillover ef-
fects of conventional and unconventional monetary policies and obtained mixed results.
While a large part of the literature highlights the strengthening of spillovers under quanti-
tative easing programs (e.g., Rogers, Scotti and Wright (2018), Yang and Zhou (2017) and
Neely (2015)), new evidence such as that in Curcuru, Kamin, Li and Rodriguez (2018)
challenges these results using a term structure model to distinguish between conventional
and unconventional monetary policies.
Less attention, however, has been paid to the differential impact of the international
spillovers from the UMPs of central banks other than the Fed. Rogers et al. (2014) com-
pare the spillovers of quantitative easing measures implemented by the Bank of England,
3See, among others, Chen, Filardo, He and Zhu (2016) Rogers, Scotti and Wright (2014), Bhattarai,
Chatterjee and Park (2018), Tillmann (2016) and Moore, Nam, Suh and Tepper (2013).
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the ECB, the Federal Reserve and the Bank of Japan, concluding that these measures con-
tributed to easier global conditions, particularly those policies implemented by the Fed.
Similar results are obtained by Chen, Lombardi, Ross and Zhu (2017) and Apostolou and
Beirne (2019) when comparing Fed and ECB spillovers. Our article contributes to this
literature by assessing the differential cross-border effects of the UMP of major central
banks on market risk uncertainty.
This article continues the extensive literature analyzing the informative content of
option-implied RNDs, which traces its roots back to the original work of Breeden and
Litzenberger (1978). A significant part of this research has focused on the methodological
issues for estimating RNDs using parametric and nonparametric techniques. Jackwerth
(2004) and Figlewski (2009) provide a good review of these methodological issues. An-
other part of the literature on RNDs has also examined their behavior during periods of
financial stress. One of the first such studies was Bates (1991), who concluded that the
1987 crash was possibly anticipated in the options markets as much as two months in ad-
vance. In a later work, Jackwerth (2000) derives risk-aversion functions from option prices
and shows that risk aversion significantly changes around the 1987 crash. Lynch and Pani-
girtzoglou (2008) extract RNDs from S&P index options and conclude that RNDs respond
to market events but are not very useful for forecasting them. In a seminal work, Birru and
Figlewski (2012) also examine RNDs in the fall of 2008, finding a strong pattern in the
RND’s responses to stock index movements.
Finally, several articles have mined the macroeconomic information content of op-
tion prices. Almeida, Ardison, Garcia and Vicente (2017) introduce an option-based tail
risk measure that provides meaningful information about aggregate macroeconomic con-
ditions, and Faccini, Konstantinidi, Skiadapoulos and Sarantopulou-Chiourea (2019) an-
alyze the properties of S&P 500 option-implied risk aversion as a predictor of US real
economic activity. Along these lines, we are not aware of papers other than Hattori et al.
(2016) dealing with the impact of UMPs in risk-neutral distributions from option prices.
3. RNDs and their estimation
Option prices contain a significant amount of information about expected returns; see
Martin (2017) and Martin and Wagner (2019). Because options are written as the dis-
counted expectation of future payoffs, investors voice their views about future asset prices
by taking positions in those options that match their prospects. The information about the
entire distribution of a later asset price from several observed option prices crystallizes
in the implied risk-neutral density (Breeden and Litzenberger, 1978). Therefore, RNDs
include information about the probability of extreme adverse movements of prices, or tail
risks.
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To assess the impact of UMPs on market tail risk perceptions, we first need to compute
the RNDs from equity option contracts. For the sake of exposition, a full description of the
methodology for estimating the RNDs is included in Appendix A, while the main results
are provided here.
3.1. Estimated RNDs
The RNDs are estimated using options from the most representative liquid stock mar-
ket indexes from the US (S&P500), the euro area (EuroStoxx50), UK (FTSE100) and
Japan (Nikkei225). The data are taken from Option Metrics IvyDG Global, a compre-
hensive database with historical information about option prices and implied volatilities
from index option markets. The sample period spans from January 2007 to December
2016, when the main UMP measures were announced. The data frequency is daily, and it
comprises more than 2,500 observations for each index. RNDs are estimated for each day
using the cross-section of option prices available on that day and reported at three different
horizons, 30, 60 and 91 days, although other maturities are also attainable.
[FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
RNDs are computed following the procedure described in Appendix A. To illustrate
the results, Figure 1 depicts the shape of RNDs for different option indexes in selected
days around UMP announcements. The different lines represent the RNDs for the day
of the announcement (solid line) and days before (dashed) and after (dotted).4. For the
sake of exposition, RNDs have been computed for a 30-day horizon, though other tenors
provide similar results.
Some interesting conclusions arise from Figure 1. For instance, graph (a) exhibits the
changes in markets’ tail risk perceptions due to the Security Market Programme (SMP) an-
nouncement by the ECB in May 2010, which involved the purchase of sovereign bonds in
the secondary markets of the so-called “dysfunctional markets” in the Eurozone. Here, we
clearly observe a reduction in the tails of the RND when the action is announced. In eco-
nomic terms, the hedging demand of investors for extreme wealth declines, crystallizing
in a lower price of the Arrow-Debreu asset for that state.
Another example is graph (b) in Figure 1, which exhibits the S&P500’s reaction to the
announcement by the Fed of an additional $600 billion purchase of longer term Treasuries
(LSAP2) on November 3, 2010. As shown, the mode of the RND clearly increases its
level when the measure is announced. Moreover, the weight on the tails is reduced, espe-
cially in the upper tail. Similar reductions in tail risks are observable in graph (c) for the
4The x-axis represent future states of the indexes (the underlying asset of the options) for a certain time
horizon. It is usual to normalize the future value of index states using the moneyness, so the current value of
index is equal to one.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 14 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2127
FTSE100 with the purchase by the BoE of nonfinancial investment-grade corporate bonds
of up to £10 billion (CBPS) and increase the stock of purchased UK government bonds
by £60 billion (APF 3); graph (d) reflects the results for the Nikkei225 following the an-
nouncement of the Quantitative and Qualitative Easing (QQE) program with yield curve
control scheme by the BoJ in September 2016. In all cases, a major repricing occurred
on the same day and the day following the relevant UMP announcement, suggesting that
UMP was successful at taming risk tail perceptions.
To offer a different perspective on the results, we compute the option-implied prob-
ability of a given percentage decline in the stock market at a given time horizon. This
statistic can be interpreted as a proxy for tail risk, and it informs about the probability of
incurring (expected) market losses of a certain level at a given time horizon. In this way,
we calculate the probabilities5 of market losses less than or equal to 5% or 10% and at
three different maturities: 30, 60 and 91 days.
Figure 2 depicts the time series of these option-implied likelihood for the indexes un-
der study. For the sake of exposition, this figure shows the evolution of the probabilities
for expected equal to or less than 10% for 1-month (gray line) and 3-month (black line)
maturities. The different UMP announcements are displayed as vertical lines.
[FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE]
Some interesting conclusions arise from the inspection of Figure 2. First, the proba-
bility of a 10% drop in the market index is systematically higher for longer than shorter
horizons, as expected. However, this distance clearly decreases during stress periods.6
Second, there is an interesting source of commonality among the different economic ar-
eas. For instance, market tail risk perceptions significantly worsened and increased in
the aftermath of the Lehman collapse on September 15, 2008. The probability of a 10%
drop in the index levels systematically spiked in all the economies under study; see, for
instance, the case of the S&P500 and the Eurostoxx50, which showed increases of 35%
and 40%, respectively, in their tail probabilities.
Third, it seems that most announcements from central banks have been successful at
calming the markets; see, for instance, Hattori et al. (2016). At the expense of a formal
test further developed, a visual inspection of Figure 2 suggests that the level of tail risk
decreases after the UMP announcements of central banks. This result is observable regard-
less of the index under consideration. For instance, the deterioration of market perceptions
in the US only eased after the announcement of the first UMP program (LSAP1).7 The
5Recall that these probabilities are, in fact, the price of (Arrow-Debreu) assets providing a positive payoff
in the event of a market loss less than or equal to 5% and 10%).
6Left-tail probability spikes are more pronounced during stress periods for short-term RNDs.
7Specifically, on November 25, 2008, the FOMC announced the purchase of $100 billion in agency debt
and $500 billion in agency mortgage-backed securities.
).
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posterior LSAP1 announcements also seem to have had an effect on option-implied tail
risks. Posterior events such as the deterioration of the European debt crisis and the worse-
than-expected macroeconomic scenario in the US provoked a worsening in market tail
risks apparently mitigated by a second round of LSAP2 by the Fed in August 2010. This
second phase also seems to have been successful, as market perceptions of risky events
significantly declined from 24 percent to approximately 14 percent. Other subsequent an-
nouncements, such as the Maturity Extension Program (MEP) and LSAP3, also affected
the probability of a 10 percent drop.
Similar conclusions arise for other economic areas in which, according to Figure 2,
UMP measures seem to have calmed the markets. For example, the famous “whatever it
takes” speech by former ECB President Mario Draghi and the announcement of Outright
Monetary Transactions (OMT) taken by the ECB in August 2012 appeared to reduce the
market perceptions of risky events by approximately 10 to 15 percentage points in the
following months. In the same vein, the UK’s central bank announced in January 2009 the
beginning of a program of large-scale purchases of public and private assets using central
bank money, and as a result, financial tensions started to ease and market perceptions to
improve8. Market expectations of risky events declined to approximately 15-20 percent.
Finally, the implementation of the Comprehensive Monetary Easing (CME) by the BoJ on
October 5, 2010, resulted in a positive impact on market perceptions.
Overall, the examples above indicate a relationship between UMP actions and reduc-
tions in market uncertainty that is formally tested in the next section.
The event-study methodology presents several advantages for our purposes. Probably
the most interesting is how this technique permits us to identify a causal impact of UMP
announcements on tail risk perceptions under certain strong conditions. These conditions
include a suitable choice of the time window9; the assumption that the unique drivers af-
8The first round was announced in March 2009 and amounted in total to 200 billion pounds of purchases
until January 2010.
9The time window of events should be narrow to avoid capturing other effects but large enough to mea-
sure the full impact of UMP announcements. Our baseline estimation considers one-day windows. This
choice is appropriate for financial indicators when capital markets are efficient because, given the efficient
market hypothesis, financial variables quickly price in new relevant information due to their forward-looking
nature. As a robustness check, we also enlarge this time window to two days. The results of this specification
can be found in Appendix E.1.
4. Event-study analysis
4.1. Generalities
To assess the impact of UMP announcements on tail risk perceptions, we first perform
an event-study analysis. This methodology has been broadly used for estimating the im-
pact of UMP on financial markets, such as bond yields and exchange rates; see, among
others, Gagnon et al. (2011) and Neely (2015).
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fecting financial variables are the UMP announcements themselves; and the developments
of financial markets are assumed not to affect monetary policy decisions. In addition,
another interesting advantage of the event-study methodology is that it enables us to dis-
entangle the effects of heterogeneous UMP measures.
In spite of its advantages, the event-study approach also suffers from some limitations.
For instance, because financial variables are only affected by the unexpected component
of news due to their forward-looking nature, one needs to be able to estimate the “surprise
component” of the UMP announcements, a difficult task to achieve. Thus, some authors
only consider QE decisions covered in the Financial Times as “announcement effects”;
see Fratzscher, Duca and Straub (2014). In the same vein, Altavilla, Giannone and Lenza
(2014) extract the average surprise variation in government bond yields on announcement
days. In addition to this complexity, major central banks have implemented quite hetero-
geneous UMPs, with substantial differences in their amounts. An even more concerning
fact for such estimation is that different measures were announced on the same day and the
overall number of announcements is limited, making it difficult to disentangle the relative
effectiveness of different UMP measures. Therefore, to relate the unexpected component
of UMP announcements to their overall volume and to compare the relative effectiveness
of different forms of UMP is a limitation imposed by the methodology. Finally, we cannot
assess the persistence of the effects of these measures in the long term.10
Following Hattori et al. (2016), the baseline regression model for each economic area i is
stated as
10The efficient market hypotheses also implies that announcements will affect long-term financial indica-







γi, jNewsi, j,t + εi,t , with α = 5%,10%, n = 1,2,3 months. (1)
where ΔFα%t,i,n stands for the change in the expected probability (in logs) of an α% decline
in the stock market for a period of n months for each area i; AUMPi,t is a dummy variable
equal to one on the day of the UMP announcement, zero otherwise; and News is a vector
of control variables that accounts for macroeconomic releases affecting each of the areas
under study, based on the Bloomberg economic surprise monitor (ECSU) and reported in
Appendix D. In addition to this set of controls, we also control for UMP announcements in
4.2. Baseline specification
We denote by Fα%i,t,n the risk-neutral probability on day t of index i experiencing a
decline of size α% for a period of n months (the risk-neutral cumulative density function).
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the rest of the areas considered. Finally, OLS estimates are calculated using Newey-West
standard errors to control for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation. 11
Table 1 reports the estimated effects of UMP announcements made by the different
central banks under study on one-month option-implied tail risks, as described in equa-
tion (1). As expected, the announcement of UMP reduces the market perceptions of the
probability of risky events in the four equity markets. Indeed, all the coefficients are statis-
tically significant with a negative sign. For instance, estimates demonstrate that UMPs are
successful at revising down the 5th percentile of tail risk probabilities by approximately
3 to 5 percent. When moving to the 10th percentile, these tail risk likelihoods decline by
between 7 and 14 percent. These estimates are consistent with those reported by Hattori
et al. (2016) for the US market, who find an impact of 13.6 on tail risks for a 20 percent de-
cline in the S&P 500 over a month. The control variable News does not have a statistically
significant impact on tail risk perceptions.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Notably, Table 1 also provides some interesting features. For example, UMP measures
have a stronger impact on sizable downside risks. The estimated coefficients are more
negative for the 10th than the 5th percentile, suggesting that UMPs mitigate larger tail
11Despite the fact that we use the most liquid index options, such as the S&P500, the Eurostoxx50, the
FTSE100 and the Nikkei225, we run a robustness check to this baseline specification to control for liquidity
risks, which are a common source of concern in option markets. This exercise can be found in Appendix
E.3.
risks. Additionally, the Fed seems to have been more successful at reducing tail risks
than other central banks. Certainly, the impact of Fed measures is larger than the results
found in other areas, which suggests that the risk-taking channel could have worked better
in the US than in other areas. Various factors may explain the relatively greater success
of the Federal Reserve. First, together with the United Kingdom, the US system is less
dependent on the banking system and more capital-intensive. Second, the Fed’s measures
were also more aggressive from the beginning. Finally, a larger number of policies were
announced in periods of heightened financial stress. All these factors have been suggested
to be relevant by the literature, but our analysis does not shed light on them.
4.3. A term structure of UMP announcements
The characteristics of our option dataset permit us to examine the impact of UMP mea-
sures on tail risk perceptions at different horizons. Taking advantage of this feature, we
repeat the baseline model estimation using one-, two- and three-month option maturities.
Table 2 presents the estimated coefficients of tail risk percentiles. For the sake of conci-
sion, other macroeconomic releases and UMP announcements in the rest of the areas have
also been controlled for but are not reported in this table.
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[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
The estimates reported in Table 2 confirm the reduction in market tail risk perceptions
across different horizons and loss thresholds. In general, the estimated coefficients are
statistically significant with a negative sign. Once again, the coefficients are larger for ex-
treme events, suggesting that UMPmeasures are perceived as hedging mechanisms against
(stock) market crashes. Interestingly, Table 2 reveals that the tail risk impact is stronger
for shorter maturities: UMP announcements result in a clear, strong signaling mechanism
for mitigating current tail risk, but their effects dilute as time passes.
These results draw a (downward-sloping) term structure of UMP effects on reducing
market tail risk. A possible explanation for this decreasing monotone relationship is that
monetary policy is conditional on the state of the world and therefore can vary in the
medium and long term depending on the economic and financial situation. The longer the
term is, the greater the uncertainty and the larger the possibility of external shocks affecting
the economic and financial conditions of countries that can even lead to a readjustment of
monetary policy. 12
4.4. Disentangling the effects of heterogeneous measures
The exceptional variety of UMP measures implemented during the period 2007-2016
constitutes a relevant source of information for disentangling which types of announce-
ments were successful at mitigating tail risks. Interested in exploiting this source of het-
erogeneity, we classify all the announcements around three major types of measures: liq-
uidity, forward guidance, and asset purchases. In our view, each of these groups has a
different goal, and their effects on financial variables and market expectations may dif-
fer.13
In the wake of the global financial crisis, central banks focused on providing liquidity
to unblock interbank markets and ease funding conditions. We use a broad definition
of liquidity measures that also includes measures to support bank lending, including the
ECB’s LTROs and TLTROs, the BOE’s Funding for Lending Scheme (FLS), and the BOJ’s
Growth Supporting Funding Facility (GSFF).
Forward guidance measures are signals about future policy actions. There are two
different types of forward guidance: Delphic or Odyssean. While the former predicts
future economic conditions, the latter only commits to a future course of action. Forward
12Examples of such external shocks are regulatory changes, changes in the outlook for the global econ-
omy, political changes affecting fiscal policy and changes in commodities prices.
13Alternative classifications were also considered. A candidate was to gather the UMP measures around
forward guidance, credit easing and QE policies. While credit easing refers to measures targeting a specific
market (e.g., to reduce specific interest rates or restore market functions), QE policies reflect any course
that unusually increases the size of central bank liabilities. However, the distinction between credit easing
and quantitative easing policies is still open to debate, so we prefer to keep this classification as simple as
possible.
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guidance actions have evolved over time from open-ended guidance to time-contingent
and state-contingent guidance.14 The Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of England and
the Bank of Japan have all provided forward guidance about future policy rates in various
forms. In this analysis, we do not distinguish among different forms of forward guidance
due to the limited number of events.
Additionally, we distinguish between asset purchases that increase the size of the bal-
14Open-ended guidance only provides qualitative information about the future path of monetary policy,
which results in a high degree of flexibility to respond to unanticipated shocks. In contrast, time-contingent
kind provides an indication of when monetary policy is likely to vary. Similarly, state-contingent guidance
produces an indication of the economic conditions that might lead to a change, such as the unemployment
rate.
ance sheet of central banks, named unsterilized asset purchases, and asset purchases that
only change the composition but not the size of the balance sheet, named sterilized as-
set purchases. This distinction is of interest since it is linked to the debate on whether
unsterilized interventions are more effective than sterilized operations (Hamada, 1999).
To assess the differential impact of heterogeneous UMP actions, we thus extend the












γi, jNewsi, j,t + εi,t , with α = 5%,10%, n = 1,2,3 months.
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients of expression (2) using options with a matu-
rity of one month. For the sake of concision, results for other controls and time horizons
are available upon request. According to the estimates in Table 3, the most effective mea-
sures for reducing tail risks seem to be forward guidance (FG) and liquidity (Liquidity)
announcements. Interestingly, these sets of measures exhibit a systematic reduction of
tail risk across economies. All the estimated coefficients are negative and statistically sig-
nificant for different thresholds, and in general, the sizes of the coefficients are higher
for forward guidance than liquidity. For instance, forward guidance (liquidity) lowers the
probability of a 10 percent crash over one month by 27 (9) percent in the case of the Fed;
13 (9) percent in the euro area; 10 (11) percent in the UK; and 27 (6) percent for the Bank
of Japan.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Forward guidance measures also exhibit a statistically significant impact on reducing
the likelihood of a 5 percent stock market slump. Again, these announcements seem to be
more effective in the US and Japan than in the euro area or UK. Consistent with previous
results, the impact of forward guidance measures on reducing tail risk seems to be greater
than that of liquidity measures. Swanson (2017) also finds that forward guidance has been
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more effective in the short run in the US in the ZLB period, but he also claims that asset
purchases are preferable for reducing longer term Treasury and interest rate uncertainty.
Other interesting results are also provided in Table 3. Regarding the debate on whether
unsterilized interventions are more effective than sterilized operations, our results are con-
sistent with the existing evidence (Hamada, 1999). Unsterilized measures are statistically
significant and negative for the Fed and ECB, and their impact is higher for (expected)
larger market declines. Finally, news releases also reduce the expected market tensions,
although their effect is limited.
These results are in line with the literature highlighting the importance of communica-
tion as a monetary policy tool (Neuenkirch, 2013), since regular information releases about
monetary policy can affect rate expectations before any actual rate change. In particular,
the central bank must be transparent and credible to be effective.
One needs to be cautious when comparing results across different areas. The effective-
ness of UMP can be affected not only by the financial structures and central bank operating
procedures in place but also by the heterogeneity of measures. 15 Nevertheless, we can-
not control for these specificities. Additionally, the circumstances in which they were
announced, such as the underlying financial and economic conditions, may play a relevant
role. For instance, it is said that during periods of financial stress, UMP tends to have
a greater impact on asset prices. However, this result has been challenged by Altavilla,
Carboni and Motto (2015).Finally, these results do not incorporate the effects of more re-
cent announcements of unconventional monetary policies in the wake of the COVID-19
crisis (such as the Pandemic emergency purchase programme in the case of the ECB or
the resumption of asset purchases of the Fed).
4.5. Cross-border effects
Although central bank balance sheet policies have been primarily designed to address
domestic economic issues, the increasing degree of financial integration and trade open-
ness among economies results in a more closely interwoven and interdependent world.
Thus, recent empirical evidence suggests the existence of cross-border effects of mone-
tary policies. For instance, Ammer, Vega and Wongswan (2010) show that foreign stocks
show stronger responses to interest rate surprises from the Fed. Groba and Serrano (2020)
also document that foreign central bank actions have an effect on the default probability of
nonfinancial firms between the US and EMU. More recently, Gourinchas, Rey and Sauzet
15The number of announcements of the different measures (liquidity, asset purchases and forward guid-
ance) across the four central banks are also uneven as can be seen in D.13. For instance, the Bank of Japan
announced much more assets purchases than the Bank of England. Moreover, the number of observations for
forward guidance and unsterilized asset purchases announcements is relatively small.In addition, as already
mentioned, different types of measures were announced on the same day, making it difficult to disentangle
the relative effectiveness of different UMP measures.
(2019) emphasize the importance of international monetary spillovers due to the role of a
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dominant international currency. These results are consistent with an international trans-
mission of monetary policy, where international firms whose cash flows depend on a for-
eign economic area would be influenced by that area’s monetary decisions and financial
intermediation plays a key role (Miranda-Agrippino and Rey, 2018).
The international sample of option prices used in this article places us in a privileged
position to examine the existence of monetary policy spillovers, in particular by examining
whether there is an impact of foreign UMP shocks on national tail risks. A first approach
to this question is provided in Figure 3, which depicts the RNDs of international indexes
registered on the dates of arrival of the announcements. 16 The figure shows the RNDs
in two groups, expansionary (Panel A) and contractionary (Panel B) measures, according
to the nature of the action taken. In particular, the announcements shown in Figure 3 cor-
respond to i) the purchase of $500 billion in agency mortgage-backed securities (LSAP1)
on November 25, 2008 (upper-left graph); ii) Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke’s speech at
Jackson Hole on August 26, 2011 (upper right); iii) the taper tantrum, that is, Bernanke’s
allusion to "drawbacks of persistently low rates..." on May 22, 2013 (bottom left); and iv)
the FOMC press conference where the Fed sketched an end to its stimulus on June 19,
2013 (bottom right).










γi, jNewsi, j,t + εi,t , (3)
with α = 5%,10% and n= 1,2,3 months. The variable β1,i stands for the estimated impact
of idiosyncratic UMP on tail risks, and β2,i represents the estimated spillover effect. For
the rest of the specification, refer to equation (1).
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 3 suggests some interesting features of the data. The first aspect is the re-
markable change in the shape of the RNDs on the days surrounding the announcement
of contractionary measures, in contrast to expansionary measures. Although the RND’s
shape changes in all cases from one day to another, this change seems to be more signif-
icant for contractionary actions. Notably, the direction of this shift in RNDs is a second
characteristic of the figures: RNDs move to the right region of the moneyness axis in ex-
pansionary announcements and to the left in the case of contractionary announcements.
Interestingly, the effect of contractionary Fed actions suggests an increase of the tail risk
in other economies such as Japan (bottom-left graph) and Europe (bottom right).
Of course, previous speculation about the existence of cross-border spillovers is not
conclusive. To conduct a formal test, we modify the baseline specification in expression
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Table 4 presents a formal test for the existence of cross-border effects between areas.
The main conclusion of this table is the relevance of the Fed in leading international mon-
etary spillovers: contractionary UMP measures from the Fed have a negative impact on
the tail risks of the euro area (Panel B) and UK (Panel C). The estimates at the two- and
three-month horizons are statistically significant and positive. Indeed, a contractionary
announcement in the US leads to an increase in the perceived likelihood of tail risks by
4 and 6 percent in euro area equity markets and by between 5 and 9 percent in UK eq-
uity markets. These results are not only driven by the "taper tantrum" but also by other
announcements of the Fed’s exit strategy. This asymmetric impact of Fed announcements
on other countries has already been suggested by the literature, and it can be explained by
the hegemonic role of the US dollar in global financial markets; see, for instance, Gourin-
chas et al. (2019). As shown in Figure 3, the Fed’s expansionary unconventional monetary
policy also tends to reduce market tail risk perceptions in other areas, but the effect is not
statically significant. Finally, we also observe spillovers from other areas, such as the BOE
or BOJ but of lesser intensity, and the results are less robust. In the case of the ECB, the
OMT and TLTRO announcements had a strong impact in the other areas 17.
In addition to the relevance of the US, and even more relevant, cross-border announce-
ments seem to affect market perceptions in the long term, which could suggest the exis-
tence of a term structure of UMPs’ impacts on tail risks. Indeed, in the previous subsec-
tion, we concluded that the idiosyncratic contributions of each area have an impact across
different horizons, somewhat similar to a level effect. However, external announcements
of monetary policy, i.e., spillovers, only affect tail risks in the long term, analogous to a
slope effect. Market participants perceive that spillovers might take time to materialize
and therefore might affect their economy in the medium term but not in the short term.
5. The dynamic effects of UMPs on tail risk perceptions
This section develops a structural vector-autoregressive model (SVAR) model to ex-
plore the dynamic effects of UMPs on market risk perceptions. The SVAR methodology
permits the further examination of the existence of an impact of UMPs on tail risks and its
persistence over time, constituting an interesting approach to assessing the effectiveness
of the policy actions.
SVAR models have been extensively used to analyze the macroeconomic effects of
conventional monetary innovations; see, for instance, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(1999), Peersman and Smets (2003) and Uhlig (2005). More recently, UMP innovations
17These results are available upon request.
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have also been studied through the lens of SVAR models, as done by Boeckx, Dossche
and Peersman (2014) and Burriel and Galesi (2018).
5.1. Variable description
The SVAR analysis developed in this article is structured around four economic vari-
ables that characterize each economic area: aggregate supply and demand, domestic (un-
conventional) monetary policy, and financial risk. We detail here the set of proxies used
for these components.
As is commonly in the literature, we employ standard macroeconomic variables as
proxies for aggregate demand and supply: monthly real GDP and inflation. Monthly real
GDP is constructed using a Chow-Lin decomposition where monthly industrial production
is the reference series. The data are taken in logs of seasonally adjusted real GDP. On the
other hand, we employ the log of seasonally adjusted consumer prices for inflation. The
data were been downloaded from FRED Economic Data, Eurostat for the data on the
Eurozone and Datastream.
The effective stance of UMP is proxied through the shadow rates ofWu and Xia (2016).
The shadow short rate (SSR) is the interest rate of the shortest maturities from an estimated
shadow yield curve of sovereign bonds according to the approach of Wu and Xia (2016)
and Krippner (2015).18 As argued by Elbourne, Ji, Duijndam et al. (2018), several reasons
support the selection of shadow rates as proxies for the UMPs. First, the forward-looking
nature of financial markets motivates the analysis of announcements of policy changes,
rather than the implementation of the measure itself. The shadow rate has the advantage
of including announcement effects of nonstandard monetary policy measures whenever
they affect bond yields. This is consistent with the empirical evidence shown in Section 4,
where UMP announcements do have an impact on tail risks. Second, shadow rates reflect
both forward guidance and quantitative easing policies; however, central bank assets fail
to take into account forward guidance measures and the announcement impact of nonstan-
dard monetary policies. Once again, this argues in favor of shadow rates since, in light
of our results, forward guidance announcements seem to be more relevant than asset pur-
chase announcements. Thus, we use the shadow rates of Wu and Xia (2016) as indicators
of UMPs, since they seem to better track our a priori beliefs about significant monetary
18Shadow rates are obtained by modeling the term structure of the yield curve; these models have been
adjusted to take into account the zero lower bound (ZLB). Specifically, Wu and Xia (2016) and Krippner
(2015) decompose the short rate process into a shadow rate, which can be negative, plus a call option
accounting for the possibility of holding cash at the ZLB, as proposed by Black (1995). The differences
between the two approaches are mainly methodological. While Wu and Xia (2016) use a three-factor model
to estimate the shadow rates, Krippner (2015) develops a two-factor model that claims to be more correlated
with unconventional monetary measures implemented in the US. The Wu and Xia (2016) method faces the
risk of overfitting the data but better fits the yield curve, especially at the short end. Several papers have
concluded that shadow rates are a good proxy for measuring the overall monetary policy stance in a ZLB
environment; see, for instance, Damjanović and Masten (2016), Wu and Xia (2016) and Krippner (2015).
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policy episodes. In particular, we employ the short-term rate of Wu and Xia (2016) for the
US, UK and the euro area. For Japan, we use the shadow rates of Krippner (2015), as Wu
and Xia (2016) do not calculate the corresponding rates for this country.
Finally, financial risk is captured by the probability of a 10 percent drop in the repre-
sentative stock market index of each economic area over a one-month period. These time
series were previously applied in Section 3. In the baseline specification, we employ the
last observation of each month for the sake of consistency. As robustness checks, we also
use the monthly median of daily data. Additionally, other percentiles of the RNDs and
VaR measures are also employed. The results are robust to these alternatives, as shown in
Section 6.
5.2. Methodology and identification strategy
This article employs a monthly Bayesian structural vector autoregression (SVAR) ap-
proach for each economic area under analysis. The benchmark VARmodel considered has
the following structural form representation:
A0Yt = k+B(L)Yt−1+ εt , (4)
where Yt is the vector of endogenous economic variables; A0 is a matrix of the contem-
poraneous reactions of the variables to the structural shock; parameter k is the intercept;
B(L) is a matrix polynomial of structural coefficients; and εt is a vector of structural inno-
vations. Following Uhlig (2005), a time trend is not ultimately included in the model. The
reduced-form representation of the model is as follows:
Yt = α +C(L)Yt−1+ut , (5)
where ut = A−10 B(L), and C(L) = A
−1
0 B(L). The reduced-form residuals have a full rank
covariance matrix, Σ = A−10 A
−1′
0 = DD
′. Structural shocks are identified through a com-
bination of zero and sign restrictions on the columns of D following the methodology of
Arias, Rubio-Ramírez and Waggoner (2018). Table 5 summarizes the restrictions imposed
on the structural impact matrix D to identify structural shocks.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
A brief discussion of the identification strategy follows. Although the shocks of interest
are unconventional monetary innovations, we also identify demand, supply and uncertainty
shocks.19 In this way, the expansionary UMP shock is identified by restricting the shadow
19Canova and Paustian (2011) demonstrate that sign-identified VAR models improve the recovery of true
structural responses when, for a given number of variables, more shocks are identified and more variables
are restricted.
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rates to decrease. Following most of the literature on monetary policy, we assume that
output and prices only react with a lag; see, for instance, Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans (2005) and Elbourne et al. (2018). Therefore, the contemporaneous impacts of
output and prices are restrained to react positively with a certain lag. This identification
strategy is related to that employed in, for instance, Uhlig (2005), Baumeistera and Benatib
(2013), Weale and Wieladek (2016) and Schenkelberg and Watzka (2013).
Aggregate demand and supply shocks are also identified to capture business cycle dis-
turbances and ensure that UMP shocks are exogenous responses to macroeconomic con-
ditions. While the aggregate demand shock is identified by restricting output and prices to
move in the same direction, supply shocks are characterized by both variables moving in
opposite directions; see Peersman and Straub (2009) and Yano (2009). Additionally, given
that policy makers do not observe aggregate demand and supply within a month – due to
the publication delay of official statistics – we assume that monetary policy does not react
immediately to unexpected changes in output growth and inflation. The imposition of a
zero contemporaneous reaction of shadow rates to aggregate demand and supply shocks is
also used by Elbourne et al. (2018). Other authors also impose a zero restriction using bal-
ance sheet data instead of shadow rates, qualifying it as “realistic” (Weale and Wieladek,
2016).
Finally, our variable of interest, tail risk, is left unrestricted in the SVAR specification,
since the central question of the paper is to assess how UMPs affect market risk percep-
tions. Unlike macroeconomic indicators, financial variables are observed in real time.
Because a rise in risky events and a decline in shadow rates have the opposite impacts on
macroeconomic variables, we opt to leave unrestricted output and inflation. Additionally,
this uncertainty shock allows us to ensure that we capture a UMP shock exogenous to
unexpected changes in market perceptions.20
The VAR model is estimated using Bayesian methods from the BEAR Toolbox of
Matlab R© developed by Dieppe, Legrand and Van Roye (2016). The data sample is monthly,
and it spans from January 2007 to December 2016, a period in which UMPs were imple-
mented. For robustness, we also restrict the estimation period to run from 2008 to 2016. To
avoid tight priors that dominate information from the data, we impose an agnostic normal
inverse-Wishart prior, similar to Uhlig (2005). Six lags of endogenous variables are esti-
mated, which seem to capture well the dynamics of the model. The model is estimated in
20To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that SVAR models with tail risk proxies have been
used to explore UMPs. This identification strategy is inspired by Elbourne et al. (2018), who also employ
shadow rates to proxy for unconventional monetary measures in a somewhat similar framework. In contrast
to Elbourne et al. (2018), we opt for parsimonious models that ensure the comparison of the results, given
the exceptional heterogeneity of the economic areas involved. In this vein, we exclude some indicators –
e.g., the interbank market’s liquidity — that work differently in each area. Our approach is possibly closer
to the identification scheme of Weale and Wieladek (2016), whose most relevant differences are the use of
the balance sheet as a proxy for UMPs and equity prices instead of tail risk perceptions.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 26 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2127
logs, allowing for implicit cointegration relationships in the data (Sims, Stock and Watson,
1990).
5.3. Results
One output of the estimation procedure is the impulse-response functions (IRFs) from
SVAR models. Figure 4 depicts the response of the economic variables under study to
an (expansionary) UMP shock of one standard deviation. Each row corresponds to an
economic variable, and the different economic areas are organized in columns. Each chart
displays the median of the posterior distribution (solid line) and the 68 percent credibility
interval (shaded area).
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Some interesting conclusions emerge from Figure 4. First, we focus on the impact of a
UMP shock on our variable of interest, tail risk. The UMP shock crystallizes in a decline
of shadow rates by 5-10 basis points at the moment of impact, and its effect fades out grad-
ually – except in the case of Japan. In the euro area and the UK, the impact is much shorter
and becomes positive on account of the increase in output and inflation. As advanced in
the event-study section, an (expansionary) UMP shock reduces tail risk perceptions in the
four areas under study, leading to a decrease of approximately two percentage points. In
general, the impact of UMP shocks is transitory and fades out after a year. In light of
these results, it seems that UMP measures have been successful at temporarily reducing
market tail perceptions. Moreover, the response of tail risk perceptions to an UMP shock
is relatively homogeneous across areas.
An additional byproduct of our procedure is the assessment of UMP shocks on macroe-
conomic variables. For example, the output growth response to an expansionary UMP
shock is significant and positive in the four areas. An expansionary one-standard-deviation
UMP shock leads to a gradual increase in output that reaches a peak at approximately 0.05
and 0.3 percent after a year. This response is similar in the US, euro area and Japan. In
the UK, the effect is much smaller, as the output growth response reaches 0.05 percent
after 10 months. This can be explained by the smaller and shorter impact of the shock
on the shadow rate, and the risk-taking channel could have been less relevant. While the
impact found in our specification is smaller than that reported in Weale and Wieladek
(2016) using balance sheet data – an unexpected 1 percent asset purchase announcement
has a maximum impact on GDP of 0.58% (US) and 0.25% (UK) – our results are closer
to those of Gambacorta, Hofmann and Peersman (2014) and higher than Elbourne et al.
(2018). Gambacorta et al. (2014) conclude that a 3 percent increase in the central bank
balance sheet has a positive impact on output of approximately 0.04% and 0.10%, and
Elbourne et al. (2018) suggest that an expansionary UMP shock that lowers the shadow
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rate by approximately 20 basis points on impact increases GDP by 0.05 percent after 20
months.
Regarding inflation, the UMP shock increases inflation in the four areas under study.
However, its impact is stronger in the US since the monetary shock increases inflation by
0.25 percent within a year, while in the rest of areas, its impact is smaller (0.05 percent in
the euro area and the UK). Similar results are obtained by Gambacorta et al. (2014), who
claim that a 3% increase in the balance sheet leads to an increase in inflation of between
approximately 0.06% and 0.11%, and Burriel and Galesi (2018), who conclude that a 25
bps decrease in shadow rates increases inflation by 0.1 percent. Again regarding Figure 4,
Japan exhibits a remarkable positive impact on inflation of approximately 0.1 percent, but
the estimation is noisy. Finally, and for the sake of concision, the remaining IRFs (shocks
to demand, supply and uncertainty) are relegated to Appendix F.
and prices is zero. Accordingly, we assume that output and prices only react with a lag,
following most of the literature on monetary policy; see, for instance, Christiano et al.
(2005), Boeckx et al. (2014) and Burriel and Galesi (2018). The expansionary UMP shock
is still identified by a reduction in the shadow rates but unidentified afterwards. Finally, the
variable of interest, the probability of a market drop, is left unrestricted. This alternative
identification scheme is summarized in Table 6.
6. Robustness checks
This section presents the results from various robustness checks to the SVAR esti-
mation grouped into two main categories that are presented in the next subsections. In
Section 6.1., we discuss alternative specifications regarding some technical aspects of the
main identification of the SVAR, such as variations in the sign restrictions imposed in the
baseline model and whether a Cholesky decomposition of the estimates of the variance-
covariance matrix affects the baseline results. In Section 6.2., we investigate whether alter-
native data characteristics could lead to substantial changes in the main results discussed
previously.
The main conclusion remains valid after all this analysis: expansionary UMPs reduce
expectations of future tail risks for all economies studied. As shown, this result is robust
to alternative SVAR identification schemes and different data characteristics.
6.1. Robustness to different identification schemes
6.1.1. Alternative specification of sign restrictions
The choice of sign restrictions in structural VAR models is not without criticism, even
in cases supported by the literature. For this reason, we propose an alternative scheme
of sign constrains for the baseline model where the contemporaneous impact of output
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE]
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Figure 5 depicts the IRFs to a UMP shock under this new identification scheme. As
shown, results are mainly robust to this specification: A one percent standard deviation
in the UMP shock temporarily reduces the probability of a market decline in an interval
of one (BoE) to 2.50 (BoJ) percentage points – depending on the economic area – and its
effect fades out after a year.
[FIGURE 5 ABOUT HERE]
The macroeconomic benefits of UMPs also spread to the real economy. Under this new
specification, the SVAR results suggest that UMPs have been effective from a macroe-
conomic perspective. An expansionary UMP shock of one standard deviation increases
output by between 0.05 (BoE) and 0.20 (BoJ) percent, depending on the area under study.
Inflation is also positively affected, increasing by approximately 0.04 (ECB, BoE) and 0.20
(Fed) percent as a result of the UMP shock, although the dispersion of these estimates re-
mains large. In essence, the results of this exercise remain qualitatively and quantitatively
similar to those of the baseline specification.
6.1.2. Cholesky decomposition
Some authors emphasize the vulnerability of SVAR models to sign restriction iden-
tification. Indeed, Elbourne et al. (2018) suggest that some UMP identifications “fail to
plausibly recover true unconventional monetary policy shocks”. To overcome this critique,
we carry out a SVAR with the same variables as in the baseline model but identified via
a standard Cholesky decomposition of the estimates of the variance-covariance matrix,
which is a clear and convenient way of identifying structural shocks.
The Cholesky decomposition imposes restrictions on the contemporaneous matrix A
of equation (4), so the order of the variables becomes essential. To this end, we first
order the so-called “slow-moving” variables that only adjust with a lag to monetary policy
shocks, on the grounds that prices are sticky; see, among others, Nave and Ruiz (2015)
and Bekaert et al. (2013). Inflation and output are then followed by the shadow rates, as
policymakers tend to react to changes in macroeconomic variables. Last are market risk
perceptions, which react instantaneously to economic news and, therefore, within the same
month. According to this configuration, we assume that policymakers do not respond to
changes in risk perceptions. This choice is especially suitable to our analysis, since our
objective is to distinguish between UMPs and uncertainty shocks, usually driven by a
period of heightened volatility in markets.
[FIGURE 6 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 6 reports the IRFs of a one-standard-deviation shock in the UMP for the areas
analyzed. As shown, the results are qualitatively robust to this new specification. Indeed,
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 29 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2127
risk perceptions react positively in the wake of a contractionary policy shock. As expected,
inflation and output react negatively to this shock. From a quantitatively point of view,
the results are also similar to those from the baseline model in Section 5, with the sole
differences being observed for the Fed and BOJ, where the impact of an unexpected UMP
shock on tail risk perceptions is somewhat smaller – approximately 0.4 and 0.5 percent for
the Fed and BoJ, respectively.
6.2. Robustness to data characteristics
6.2.1. SVAR with balance sheet data
We propose an alternative specification of the baseline SVAR model of equation (4)
using balance sheet data instead of shadow rates. This novel proposal includes a vector
of endogenous variables Yt comprising consumer prices (in logs, seasonally adjusted); real
GDP (in logs, seasonally adjusted); central banks’ total assets (in logs); the level of tail risk
perceptions; and the effective interest rate. As in the baseline model, structural shocks are
identified through a combination of zero and sign restrictions following the methodology
of Arias et al. (2018) and summarized in Table 7. Finally, the model is estimated by means
of Bayesian methods using monthly data from 2007 to 2016.
[TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
A brief discussion of this alternative specification follows. The UMP shock is identi-
fied through an expansion of the balance sheet that increases inflation and output with a
lag, similar to the baseline specification. To identify an exogenous UMP shock, we impose
a zero impact effect on effective interest rates to impose orthogonality between unconven-
tional and conventional monetary policy shocks. Policy rates are restrained to be zero
at impact and left unidentified afterwards. Additionally, we identify aggregate demand,
supply and uncertainty shocks to ensure that unconventional monetary innovations are ex-
ogenous to macroeconomic and financial conditions. These three shocks are identified in
the same way as in the baseline model (4), except for the zero restriction imposed on the
effective rate.
Figure 7 reports the IRFs for a one-standard-deviation UMP shock in the sample an-
alyzed. The results show that a one-percent increase in central bank assets leads to an
approximately one- or two-percent decline in risk perceptions, depending on the area con-
sidered. The most marked impact of UMPs was, once again, observed for the US. How-
ever, it is important to note that i) these results are not directly comparable with the output
of the baseline model (4), and ii) the balance sheet data do not capture forward guidance
measures or announcement effects.
[FIGURE 7 ABOUT HERE]
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Turning to the macroeconomic variables, inflation and output react positively to an
expansionary balance sheet shock. A one-percent increase in total assets leads to an in-
crease of approximately 0.05 to 0.10 percent in inflation. Similarly, a shock to total assets
results in an approximately 0.10 to 0.20 percent increase in aggregate output, although the
estimates exhibit high variance. Comparing these results with those in the literature, our
findings are in line with those of Gambacorta et al. (2014), who report that a 3.00% in-
crease in the balance sheet is associated with an increase in inflation of between 0.06 and
0.11% and an increase in output of between 0.06 and 0.15%. Weale and Wieladek (2016)
also report increases in GDP and inflation in response to increases in asset purchases, but
their estimates are smaller than ours: a 1% increase (in terms of GDP) in asset purchase
announcements leads to a maximum impact on GDP of 0.58% in the US and 0.25% in
the UK. For inflation, a 1% increase (in terms of GDP) in asset purchase announcements
results in increases of 0.6% (US) and 0.32% (UK).
6.2.2. SVAR with different subsamples
Some criticism could arise when using the shadow rates to proxy for UMP shocks dur-
ing the period 2007-2016. This concern is mainly based on the difficulty of disentangling a
conventional from an unconventional monetary policy shock within our sample period. To
confirm that our results are driven by UMP measures, we re-estimate the baseline SVAR
specification over the period 2008-2016. Then, the year 2007 is discarded because all the
central banks under study cut interest rates in response to market turmoil. The results, not
presented here but available in Figure 8 in Appendix F, show that the main conclusions of
this article remain unaltered: the results are robust to this subsample period, even though
some uncertainty is found in the estimates of the results regarding the ECB.
[FIGURE 8 ABOUT HERE]
6.2.3. Other robustness checks
We conduct additional robustness checks of the baseline model under alternative spec-
ifications of the tail risk variable. The list of analyses comprises the use of the monthly
median observation of the RND distribution, instead of the last monthly observation; the
application of different percentiles of the RND; and the utilization of value-at-risk (VaR)
measures. Again, our main findings are robust to all these alternatives. These results are
available upon request.
7. Conclusions
Unconventional monetary policies (UMPs) affect perceived market uncertainty. The
event study developed in this article shows that UMP announcements mitigate the tail risk
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perceptions of stock market investors. These results are consistent across monetary areas,
loss thresholds and time horizons. Specifically, the impact seems to be stronger for sizable
and near-term downside risks.
The detailed database of UMP announcements constructed in this article permits us to
identify the efficacy of the measures taken. The empirical findings show that the most ef-
fective measures at reducing tail risks are forward guidance and liquidity announcements.
In addition, unsterilized interventions are better than sterilized operations at calming mar-
kets. These results are in line with the literature highlighting the importance of commu-
nication as a monetary policy tool (Neuenkirch, 2013), since regular information releases
about monetary policy can affect rate expectations before actual rate changes. In particular,
this information must be transparent and credible to be effective.
An original finding provided by this article is that spillover effects between areas are
relevant and should be considered. The estimations indicate that the Fed’s contractionary
actions lead to an increase in tail risk in other economies, mainly in European and UK
markets. Interestingly, cross-border announcements seem to affect market perceptions in
the long term, which could suggest the existence of a term structure of UMPs’ impact
on tail risks. This result is probably explained by the relevance of the Federal Reserve
as a global liquidity provider, due to the importance of the US dollar in global financial
markets.
The results of the event-study exercise are confirmed by a SVAR model. The estimates
confirm that UMP announcements temporarily reduce tail risk perceptions, and their ef-
fect seems to fade out after a year. Moreover, UMP measures seem to have had a positive
impact on output and inflation. A series of robustness checks reinforces the main conclu-
sion of this article: the impact of heterogeneous UMPs lowers the probability of market
downturns.
From an academic perspective, the empirical findings support the risk-taking channel
of Borio and Zhu (2012), in which monetary policy affects other markets and assets via
its impact on risk perceptions and financial sector risk-taking. In this vein, the results can
be interpreted in different ways. First, announcements can reduce the level of uncertainty
since they can have an insurance effect on tail risks, as suggested by Figlewski (2009).
Second, UMP measures can relax the balance sheet constraints of leveraged investors,
reducing the risk of exceeding the VaR limits if these risk management models are based on
them. Finally, UMP announcements might constitute a channel that influences aggregate
risk aversion, as highlighted by Bekaert et al. (2013).
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Table 1: UMP announcements and option-implied tail risks in the short run
















UMP -0.05*** -0.14*** -0.03*** -0.09*** -0.04*** -0.10*** -0.04*** -0.07**
[0.012] [0.032] [0.011] [0.028] [0.009] [0.029] [0.012] [0.035]
News 0 -0.01* 0 -0.01 -0.01** -0.03** 0 -0.02
[0.002] [0.007] [0.010] [0.021] [0.003] [0.011] [0.007] [0.022]
Obs. 2,517 2,517 2,541 2,541 2,552 2,552 2,447 2,447
Notes: The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2016. The dependent variable refers to the daily change in the option-
implied probability of a 5% and 10% decrease in the S&P500, the EuroStoxx 50, the FTSE 100 and the Nikkei 225 for a period t =
1 month. UMP is a dummy variable that captures the announcement dates of major unconventional monetary policies in each area,
including liquidity measures. Further details about the list of events included are provided in Appendix C. “News” controls for relevant
macro releases in each area; see D.13 for more information. UMP announcements in the rest of the areas are also controlled for.
Newey-West standard errors in brackets, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 2: UMP and option-implied tail risks across different horizons
















1-month -0.05*** -0.14*** -0.03*** -0.09*** -0.04*** -0.10*** -0.04*** -0.07**
[0.012] [0.032] [0.011] [0.028] [0.009] [0.029] [0.012] [0.035]
2-month -0.03*** -0.06*** -0.01* -0.03** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.03**
[0.007] [0.012] [0.008] [0.014] [0.006] [0.011] [0.013] [0.014]
3-month -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.02*** -0.03*** 0.01 -0.01
[0.005] [0.009] [0.009] [0.012] [0.006] [0.008] [0.013] [0.012]
Obs. 2,517 2,517 2,541 2,541 2,552 2,552 2,447 2,447
Notes: The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2016. The dependent variable refers to the daily change in the option-
implied probability of a 5% and 10% decline in the S&P500, the EuroStoxx 50, the FTSE 100 and the Nikkei 225 for a period t = 1, 2
or 3 months. UMP is a dummy variable that captures the announcement dates of major unconventional monetary policies in each area,
including liquidity measures. Further details about the list of events included are provided in Appendix C. In all the regressions, other
relevant macroeconomic releases (“News”) and other UMP announcements in other areas have been controlled for, even if not reported
in this table. Newey-West standard errors in brackets, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3: Heterogeneous UMP and option-implied tail risks in the short run
















Liquidity -0.04 -0.09** -0.03** -0.09** -0.04*** -0.11*** -0.04*** -0.06**
[0.024] [0.037] [0.014] [0.038] [0.011] [0.035] [0.014] [0.029]
Sterilized AP 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 0 0.01
[0.017] [0.107] [0.021] [0.051] [0.016] [0.026]
Unsterilized AP -0.03** -0.08*** -0.04** -0.08* -0.03 -0.09 -0.01 -0.03
[0.014] [0.029] [0.020] [0.048] [0.021] [0.070] [0.020] [0.069]
FG -0.09*** -0.27*** -0.03*** -0.13*** -0.05*** -0.10*** -0.10*** -0.27***
[0.012] [0.051] [0.013] [0.029] [0.017] [0.024] [0.018] [0.040]
News 0 -0.01* 0 0 -0.01** -0.03*** 0 -0.02
[0.002] [0.007] [0.002] [0.005] [0.003] [0.011] [0.007] [0.022]
Observations 2,517 2,517 2,541 2,541 2,552 2,552 2,447 2,447
Notes: The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2016. The dependent variable refers to the daily change in the option-
implied probability of a 5% and 10% decline in the S&P500, the EuroStoxx 50, the FTSE 100 and the Nikkei 225 for a period t = 1, 2
or 3 months. UMP announcements are disaggregated into liquidity, sterilized asset purchases, unsterilized asset purchases and forward
guidance. Further details about the list of events included are provided in Appendix C. “News” controls for relevant macro releases in
each area; see D.13 for further information. UMP announcements in the rest of the areas are also controlled for. Newey-West standard
errors in brackets, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Panel A: Spillover to the US
BOE UMP -0.01 0 -0.01* -0.01 -0.01* -0.01
[0.011] [0.035] [0.006] [0.013] [0.004] [0.008]
ECB UMP 0 0.01 0 0 0 0
[0.015] [0.046] [0.008] [0.018] [0.006] [0.012]
BOJ UMP -0.01 -0.03 0 -0.01 0 0
[0.010] [0.030] [0.005] [0.011] [0.004] [0.007]
Panel B: Spillover to the Euro Area
Fed’s expansionary UMP -0.01 -0.02 0.01 0 0.01 0
[0.016] [0.040] [0.010] [0.018] [0.010] [0.014]
Fed’s contractionary UMP 0.04 0.04 0.04** 0.06* 0.04** 0.06**
[0.026] [0.087] [0.018] [0.031] [0.018] [0.024]
BOJ UMP -0.01 -0.04* 0 -0.01 0 0
[0.008] [0.020] [0.006] [0.010] [0.006] [0.008]
BOE UMP 0 -0.01 0 0 0 0
[0.010] [0.021] [0.008] [0.011] [0.008] [0.010]
Panel C: Spillover to UK
Fed’s expansionary UMP -0.01 -0.04 0.01 0 0.01* 0.01
[0.018] [0.057] [0.008] [0.017] [0.008] [0.011]
Fed’s contractionary UMP 0.05 0.17 0.05** 0.09* 0.05* 0.08**
[0.051] [0.186] [0.027] [0.055] [0.028] [0.040]
ECB UMP -0.01 -0.02 0 -0.02 0 -0.01
[0.014] [0.042] [0.007] [0.017] [0.006] [0.010]
BOJ UMP -0.01 -0.04 -0.01* -0.02* -0.01* -0.02*
[0.011] [0.036] [0.006] [0.013] [0.006] [0.009]
Panel D: Spillover to Japan
Fed’s expansionary UMP 0 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
[0.023] [0.048] [0.017] [0.024] [0.016] [0.022]
Fed’s contractionary UMP -0.02 -0.02 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01
[0.030] [0.085] [0.022] [0.034] [0.013] [0.021]
ECB UMP -0.01 -0.01 0 0 0.01 0.01
[0.015] [0.038] [0.012] [0.019] [0.010] [0.014]
BOE UMP 0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[0.014] [0.033] [0.011] [0.017] [0.010] [0.014]
The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2016. The dependent variable refers to the daily
change in the option-implied probability of a 5% and 10% decline in the S&P500, the EuroStoxx 50, the
FTSE 100 and the Nikkei 225 for a period t = 1, 2 or 3 months. UMP is a dummy variable that captures the
announcement dates of major unconventional monetary policies in each area, including liquidity measures.
Further details about the list of events included are provided in Appendix C. We also control for relevant
macro releases in each area, even if not reported; see D.13 for additional information. Newey-West standard
errors in brackets, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 5: Identification restrictions
Variables/Shocks Monetary policy Demand Supply Uncertainty
Inflation + + -
Output + + +
Shadow rates - 0 0 -
Risk +
Notes: Zero restrictions are imposed on impact, while sign restrictions are imposed on impact and the first month after the shock, except
for the case of inflation and output for the UMP shock. In this specific case, sign restrictions are imposed on the first and second month
after the shock.
Table 6: Alternative identification restrictions
Variables/Shocks Monetary policy Demand Supply Uncertainty
Inflation 0 + -
Output 0 + +
Shadow rates - 0 0 -
Risk +
Notes: Zero restrictions are imposed on impact, while sign restrictions are imposed on impact and the first month after the shock.
Table 7: Alternative identification restrictions
Variable/Shocks Monetary policy Demand Supply Uncertainty Undefined
Inflation + + -
Output + + +
CB total assets + +
Risk +
Policy rate 0 0 0
Notes: Zero restrictions are imposed on impact, while sign restrictions are imposed on impact and the first month after the shock, except
for the case of inflation and output for the UMP shock. In this specific case, sign restrictions are imposed on the first and second month
after the shock.
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Figure 1: RNDs on relevant UMP announcement dates
(a) EuroStoxx50 - May 10, 2010 (b) S&P500 - November 3, 2010
(c) FTSE100 - August 4, 2016 (d) Nikkei225 - September 21, 2016
Changes in RNDs on given UMP announcement dates by moneyness degree. The figures show the corre-
sponding stock index implied RND on the date of the announcement (solid line) and the days before (dashed)
and after (dotted). Graph (a) corresponds to the SMP announcement by the ECB on May 10, 2010; graph (b)
represents the notification of the LSPA2 program by the Fed on November 3, 2010; graph (c) corresponds to
the communication of CBPS and APF3 programs by the BoE on August 4, 2016; and graph (d) represents
the QQE program of the BoJ announced on September 21, 2016. All program acronyms are provided in
Appendix B.
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 43 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2127
Figure 2: Option-implied probabilities of a 10% decline in stock index at different horizons
S&P500 EuroStoxx50
FTSE100 Nikkei225
Time series of option-implied probabilities of a 10% decline in the stock market index at the 1-month (gray line) and 3-month (black line) horizon. Vertical
lines represent UMP announcements of their respective central banks. The data frequency is daily and spans from January 2007 to December 2016. See
Appendix B for acronyms.
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Figure 3: RNDs of different indexes to Fed announcements
Panel A.- Expansionary UMPs
EuroStoxx50 - November 26, 2008 EuroStoxx50 - August 29, 2011
Panel B.- Contractionary UMPs
Nikkei 225 - May 22, 2013 EuroStoxx50 - June 19, 2013
Changes in RNDs on given Fed UMP announcement dates. The figures show the corresponding stock
index’s implied RND on the date of the arrival of the announcement (solid line) and the days before (dashed)
and after (dotted). The figures are grouped according to the nature of UMP measure taken: expansionary
(Panel A) and contractionary (Panel B). The graphs corresponds to the following: i) the purchase of $500
billion in agency mortgage-backed securities (LSAP1) on November 25, 2008 (upper-left graph); ii) Fed
Chairman Ben Bernanke’s speech at Jackson Hole on August 26, 2011 (upper right); iii) Bernanke’s allusion
to "drawbacks of persistently low rates..." onMay 22, 2013 (bottom left); and iv) the FOMC press conference
where the Fed sketched an end to its stimulus on June 19, 2013 (bottom right). All program acronyms are
provided in Appendix B.
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Figure 4: Impulse-response functions to UMP shocks
Impulse-response functions (IRFs) to expansionary UMP shocks. The figure depicts the response of the economic variables under study to an (expansionary) UMP shock of one standard deviation. Each row
corresponds to an economic variable: inflation, output, shadow rates and risk perceptions. The different economic areas are organized in columns. Each chart displays the median of the posterior distribution (solid
line) and the 68 percent credibility interval (shaded area).
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Figure 5: Impulse-response functions to UMP shocks under alternative sign restrictions
Impulse-response functions (IRFs) to expansionary UMP shocks under alternative sign restrictions. The figure shows the response of the economic variables under study to an (expansionary) UMP shock of one
standard deviation. Each row corresponds to an economic variable: inflation, output, shadow rate and risk perceptions. The different economic areas are organized in columns. Each chart displays the median of the
posterior distribution (solid line) and the 68 percent credibility interval (shaded area).
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Figure 6: Impulse-response functions to UMP shocks under Cholesky decomposition
Impulse-response functions (IRFs) to contractionary UMP shocks under a Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the SVAR model. The figure shows the response of the economic variables
under study to a (contractionary) UMP shock of one standard deviation. Each row corresponds to an economic variable: inflation, output, shadow rates and risk perceptions. The different economic areas are
organized in columns. Each chart displays the median of the posterior distribution (solid line) and the 68 percent credibility interval (shaded area).
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Figure 7: Impulse-response functions to UMP shocks with balance sheet data
Impulse-response functions (IRFs) to expansionary UMP shocks using balance sheet data. The figure shows the response of the economic variables under study to an (expansionary) UMP shock of one standard
deviation. Each row corresponds to an economic variable: inflation, output, shadow rates and risk perceptions. The different economic areas are organized in columns. Each chart displays the median of the posterior
distribution (solid line) and the 68 percent credibility interval (shaded area).
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Figure 8: Impulse-response functions to UMP shocks for the 2008-2016 subsample
Impulse-response functions (IRFs) to expansionary UMP shocks for the 2008-2016 subsample. The figure shows the response of the economic variables under study to an (expansionary) UMP shock of one standard
deviation. Each row corresponds to an economic variable: inflation, output, shadow rates and risk perceptions. The different economic areas are organized in columns. Each chart displays the median of the posterior
distribution (solid line) and the 68 percent credibility interval (shaded area).
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Appendix A. Extraction of the RNDs
In this article, we use a nonparametric approach to extract RNDs from implied volatil-
ity surfaces provided by OptionMetrics. A clear advantage of the use of a nonparametric
approach is that we avoid any restriction on the shape of the RND, a convenient feature
for our analysis, which is focused on the left tail of the RND.
The seminal work of Breeden and Litzenberger (1978) shows that the second derivative
of the price of a call with respect to the strike is equivalent to the risk-neutral probability.21
The price of a call option is the discounted risk-neutral expectation of the payoff of the
option on the expiration date T,
21See Jackwerth (1999) for a review of methodologies to extract risk-neutral densities from option prices.
provided by OptionMetrics. For a certain date, these files consist of a grid of Black-
Scholes-Merton implied volatilities (σbsm) for different standardized maturities (30, 60,
91 days, . . . ) and for different values of delta, Δ. The Δs range from 0.2 to 0.8, spaced
in intervals of 0.05, resulting in approximately 13 points. We follow Malz (1997), who
suggests to interpolate/extrapolate option prices (implied volatilities) in the Δ domain,
C = e−rT EQ[ST −X ] , (A.1)
where C stands for the call price, ST is the price of the underlying asset on the expiration




[ST −X ] fQ(ST )dST , (A.2)
were fQ is the risk-neutral probability density and FQ stands for the risk-neutral distribu-
tion function. Taking the partial derivative with respect to the strike prices in equation











To construct a smooth RND according to equation (A.4), we ideally need a continuum
of strike prices encompassing future payoffs. Unfortunately, option prices are discrete,
and exercise prices for traded option contracts may be far apart. Then, some sort of inter-
polation is required to soften price noise.
As we have mentioned, in our estimations, we employ the implied volatility surfaces
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instead of in the moneyness domain. The main advantage of this procedure is that the Δ
domain for call options is bounded between 0 and 1, whereas moneyness is unbounded.
The first step consists of extrapolating the implied volatility function. Some valuable
information in the extremes of the distribution could be lost by restricting the delta range;
thus to address this potential scarcity of data, in line with Bliss and Panigirtzoglou (2004),
we add two additional pseudo-points on both tails of the smile, with a space of 0.05 Δs,
and assign to them the closest observed delta. As a result, the number of observations
used for extracting RNDs increases from 13 to 17.




, we fit a cubic smoothing spline, and











where mi is a given weight of the squared error; σbsmi and g(Δi,θ) are the empirical and
fitted implied volatilities of the ith option, respectively; θ is a parameter vector that de-
fines the smoothing spline (p(x,θ)) and whose coefficients are calculated by OLS without
imposing any shape; and finally, λ is a smoothing parameter that balances the smoothness
of the spline and its goodness-of-fit, and it is fixed to 0.9.
In the third stage of our procedure, deltas are converted into exercise prices (mon-
eyness), and the interpolated volatilities are converted into call prices using the Black-
Scholes-Merton formula.
Finally, equation A.4 is estimated by finite-differences using the interpolated values of
moneyness and call prices.
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Appendix B. Acronyms for UMP programmes
Table B.8: Acronyms for UMP programmes
Acronym Definition
Liq Liquidity
LSAP Large Scale Asset Purchases
MEP Maturity Extension Programme
FG Forward Guidance
TAPER Taper Tantrum
SLTRO Supplementary Longer-term Refinancing Operations
LTRO Long-term Refinancing Operations
FRTFA Fixed-rate Tenders with Full Allotment
SMP Securities Market Programme
CBPP Covered-Bond Purchase Programme
WIT "Whatever it takes" speech of ECB president Mario Draghi
OMT Outright Monetary Transactions
ABSPP Asset-Backed Securities Purchase Programme
EAPP Expanded Asset Purchase Programme
APP Asset Purchase Programme
SLS Special Liquidity Scheme
APF Asset Purchase Facility
FLS Funding Lending Scheme
SFSO Special Funds Supplying Operations
GSFF Growth-Supporting Funding Facility
CME Comprehensive Monetary Easing
QQE Quantitative and Qualitative monetary Easing
QQEnir QQE with negative interest rates
QQEYCC QQE with Yield Curve Control scheme
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Appendix C. List of UMP announcements
This paper covers an extensive number of announcements of unconventional mone-
tary policies. More than 160 events are identified from 2007 to 2016, mostly including
new announcements on press conferences, press releases and statements of the FOMC,
the Government Council of the ECB, the Monetary Policy Committee of the BoE and the
Policy Board of Bank of Japan. This dataset also includes some announcements from a
few speeches such as the “Whatever it takes” speech of the former ECB President Draghi.
All this information have been tracked from the websites of the four central banks, which
constitute our major sources of information. We have also checked the information pro-
vided in relevant papers cited in this document, such as Falagiarda, McQuade and Tirpák
(2015) and Altavilla et al. (2015).
In order to capture the “relevant announcements”, we only include those announce-
ments that reveal new information. The number of total announcements per central banks
is relatively even. The Bank of Japan made over the period analyzed the major number
of announcements (52), while the Bank of England announced 34 measures. The Fed
made 37 announcements and the ECB 41 over the period analyzed. A more difficult task
is the aggregation of these announcements by type of measure: liquidity, asset purchases
and forward guidance. This is due to the fact that different types of measures have been
announced on the same day. In this case, only the most unexpected and novel measure is
considered. Some robustness checks have also been carried out without big impact on the
results. For further information, see tables C.9,C.10, C.11 and C.12 that provide all the
announcements covered in this paper.
Table C.9: Dates of UMP measures for Federal Reserve
Date Announcement Measure
17/08/2007 Term Discount Window Program’s announcement Liquidity
12/12/2007 Term Auction Facility ’s announcement and Reciprocal Currency
Agreements
Liquidity
11/03/2008 Term Securities Lending Facility and Single-Tranche OMO pro-
gramme
Liquidity
19/09/2008 ABCP Money Market Fund Liquidity Facility (CPFF) Liquidity
25/11/2008 Purchase $100 billion of agency debt and $500 billion agency
mortgage-backed securities
LSAP1
Continued on next page
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Table C.9 – Continued from previous page
Date Announcement Measure
16/12/2008 “The Committee anticipates that weak economic conditions are
likely to warrant low levels of federal funds rate for some time”
0-25 bp Fed funds rate target; possibility of long-term Treasury
purchases.
FG
28/01/2009 Expansion of QE to include long-term Treasuries LSAP1
18/03/2009 Expansion of QE: $300 billion in Treasuries, $750 billion of
agency MBS, increase holdings of agency debt to $200 billion;
low federal funds rate for an extended period
LSAP1
12/08/2009 Slow pace of purchases. All purchases will be finished by the end
of October, not mid-September
LSAP1 EXIT
23/09/2009 Gradually slow pace of purchases. Agency debt and MBS pur-
chases will finish at the end of 2010Q1
LSAP1EXIT
04/11/2009 Limit agency debt purchases below previously announced $200
billion. Agency debt purchases will finish at $175 billion
LSAP1/EXIT
10/08/2010 BS will be maintained.Reinvest MBS principal into Treasuries;
low rates for an extended period.
LSAP1
27/08/2010 Bernanke speech at Jackson Hole, mentioning potential addi-
tional purchases of long-term securities.
LSAP2
15/10/2010 Bernanke speech at Boston Fed: prepared for more policy accom-
modation if needed.
LSAP2
03/11/2010 Purchase of a further $600 billion of longer term Treasuries. LSAP2
22/06/2011 QE2 finishes: treasury purchases will wrap up at the end of the
month, as scheduled; principal payments will continue to be rein-
vested.
LSAP2/ EXIT
09/08/2011 Growth slower than expected; low fed funds rate at least until
mid-2013.
FG
26/08/2011 Bernanke speech at Jackson Hole FG
21/09/2011 MEP using $400 billion Treasury securities announced. MEP
25/01/2012 FOMC meeting: Low federal funds rate at least until late 2014. FG
20/06/2012 FOMCmeeting: MEP extended until end-2012; low federal funds
rate through late 2014.
MEP
31/08/2012 Bernanke speech, Jackson Hole, Wyoming. LSAP3
Continued on next page
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Table C.9 – Continued from previous page
Date Announcement Measure
13/09/2012 FOMC meeting: Fixed monthly MBS and Treasury purchases;
mid-2015 rate guidance.
LSAP3
12/12/2012 FOMCmeeting: 6,5% unemployment threshold introduced in the
rate guidance.
LSAP3
22/05/2013 Bernanke alludes to “drawbacks of persistently low rates...” TAPER
19/06/2013 FOMC statement offers no clarification to the Chairman’s May
speech.
TAPER
18/12/2013 Cut monthly purchases of MBS and Treasuries to $35 billion and
$40 billion. Unemployment rate threshold of 6,5% for lift-off
abandoned.
EXIT
29/01/2014 Cut monthly purchases of MBS and Treasuries to $30 billion and
$35 billion.
EXIT
19/03/2014 Cut monthly purchases of MBS and Treasuries to $25 billion and
$30 billion.
EXIT
30/04/2014 Cut monthly purchases of MBS and Treasuries to $20 billion and
$25 billion.
EXIT
18/06/2014 FOMC statement: Cut monthly MBS and Treasuries purchases to
$15 and $20 billion
EXIT
30/07/2014 FOMC statement: Cut monthly MBS and Treasuries purchases to
$10 and $15 billion
EXIT
17/09/2014 FOMC statement: Cut monthly MBS and Treasuries purchases to
$5 and $10 billion
EXIT
29/10/2014 FOMC statement: "The Committee decided to conclude its asset
purchase program this month"
EXIT
18/03/2015 "an increase in the target range for the federal funds rate remains
unlikely at the April FOMC meeting"
FG
28/10/2015 FOMC statement. It mentions probability of raising interest rates
in the next meeting.
FG
16/12/2015 FOMC statement: "only gradual increases in the federal funds
rate. The federal funds rate is likely to remain, for some time,
below levels that are expected to prevail in the longer run."
FG
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Table C.10: Dates of UMP measures for European Central Bank
Date Announcement Measure
22/08/2007 Announcement of Supplementary LTROs with a maturity of
months
LTRO
12/12/2007 Reciprocal currency agreements RCA
28/03/2008 Supplementary 6-month LTROs LTRO
07/10/2008 Enhance LTROs and expand US dollar liquidity providing opera-
tions
LTRO
08/10/2008 Announcement of a fixed rate tender procedure with full allot-
ment on MROs
FRTPFA
15/10/2008 Expansion of the list of assets eligible as collateral, enhance the
provision of LTROs and provide US dollar liquidity through for-
eign swaps.
LTRO
18/12/2008 MROs will continue to be carried out through FRTFA for as long
as needed.
FRTPFA
07/05/2009 Announcement of CBPP with an initial amount of 60 mm E and
LTROs with a maturity of one year.
CBPP/LTRO
04/06/2009 Details of technical modalities of CBPP1 CBPP
03/12/2009 Enhancement of the provision of LTROs and continue conducting
MROs as FRTFA for as long as needed
FRTPFA/LTRO
04/03/2010 Enhancement of the provision of LTROs and continue conducting
MROs as FRTFA for as long as needed
FRTPFA/LTRO
10/05/2010 Announcement of Securities Market Programme (SMP) SMP
04/08/2011 Further LTROs with a maturity of and months LTRO
08/08/2011 The GovC decided to actively implement its SMP for Italy and
Spain
SMP
06/10/2011 New Covered Bond Purchase Programme (CBPP2) for an in-
tended amount of 40billion.
CBPP
03/11/2011 Technical modalities of CBPP2 CBPP
08/12/2011 The GovC decided to conduct 2 LTROs with a maturity of 3 years
and to increase collateral availability.
LTRO
06/06/2012 FRTPFA for as long as necessary, and to conduct 3-month LTROs
and FRTPFA, at least until January 2013
FRTPFA/LTRO
26/07/2012 Draghi’s London speech "whatever it takes..." FG/OMT
Continued on next page
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Table C.10 – Continued from previous page
Date Announcement Measure
02/08/2012 Announcement of outright open market operations (OMT) of a
size adequate to reach its objective.
OMT
06/09/2012 Technical details of OMTs OMT
06/12/2012 FRTPFA for as long as necessary, and to conduct 3-month LTROs
as FRTPFA, at least until July 2013
FRTPFA/LTRO
02/05/2013 FRTPFA for as long as necessary, and at least until July 2014 FRTPFA/LTRO
04/07/2013 The GovC expects the key ECB interest rates to remain at present
or lower levels for an extended period of time
FG
07/11/2013 FRTPFA for as long as necessary, and at least until July 2015. FRTPFA/LTRO
05/06/2014 Targeted long-term refinancing operations (T-LTROs) TLTRO
03/07/2014 Technical details for the series of TLTROs TLTRO
29/07/2014 ECB publishes legal act relating to T-LTROs TLTRO
04/09/2014 Announcement of purchases of ABS (ABSPP) and a broad
portfolio of euro-denominated covered bonds issued by MFIs
(CBPP3)
ABSPP/CBPP
02/10/2014 Operational details of ABSPP and CBPP3. it will last two yeas ABSPP/CBPP
17/11/2014 “The GovC is unanimous in its commitment to using additional
unconventional instruments [â] Unconventional measures might
entail the purchase of a variety of assets, one of which is sovereign
bonds” (M. Draghi’s speech at the EP)
APP
26/11/2014 “we will have to consider buying other assets, including sovereign
bonds in the secondary market [â]” (V. Constancio, London)
APP
04/12/2014 “Evidently, we are convinced that a QE programme which could
include sovereign bonds falls within our mandate” (Draghi’s press
conference)
APP
22/01/2015 Announcement of the expanded asset purchase programme
(EAPP).
APP
03/12/2015 Extension of EAPP until the end of March 2017, or beyond, if
necessary.
APP
10/03/2016 Increase of monthly purchases to 80 billion euros (EAPP) (from
60bn) and inclusion of a new Corporate Sector Purchase Pro-
gramme (CSPP)
APP
Continued on next page
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Table C.10 – Continued from previous page
Date Announcement Measure
21/04/2016 Technical details of the corporate sector purchase programme
(CSPP).
APP
02/06/2016 The Eurosystem will start making purchases under its corporate
sector purchase programme (CSPP).
APP
21/07/2016 “The Governing Council confirms that the monthly asset pur-
chases of 80 billion euros are intended to run until the end of
March 2017, or beyond, if necessary, and in any case until it sees
a sustained adjustment in the path of inflation consistent with its
inflation aim.”
FG
20/10/2016 “The Governing Council continues to expect the key ECB interest
rates to remain at present or lower levels for an extended period
of time, and well past the horizon of the net asset purchases.Â´Â´
FG
08/12/2016 “The GC decided to continue its purchases under the asset pur-
chase programme (APP) at the current monthly pace of 80 billion
euros until the end of March 2017. From April 2017, the net asset
purchases are intended to continue at a monthly pace of 60 billion
euros until the end of December 2017, or beyond, if necessary”
APP
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Table C.11: Dates of UMP measures for Bank of England
Date Announcement Measure
12/12/2007 Reciprocal currency agreements, announced by five central banks Liquidity
21/04/2008 Special liquidity Scheme Liquidity
17/09/2008 Extension of the Special liquidity Scheme Liquidity
03/10/2008 Extended collateral long term repo operations Liquidity
13/10/2008 Further us dollar liquidity operations Liquidity
19/12/2008 US dollar operations Liquidity
19/01/2009 The Chancellor of the Exchequer announces the BoE will set up
an APF.
APF/QE1
03/02/2009 Extension of swap facility and info about SLS Liquidity
06/02/2009 Details about app APF/QE1
05/03/2009 APF announcement: £75 billion of gilts APF/QE1
07/05/2009 APF extended to £125 billion. APF/QE1
06/08/2009 APF extended to £175 billion APF/QE1
05/11/2009 APF extended to £200 billion. APF/QE1
10/05/2010 Reactivation of US dollar swap facility Liquidity
17/12/2010 ECB swap line agreement Liquidity
21/12/2010 Extension of US dollar swap facility Liquidity
15/09/2011 Additional US dollar liquidity providing operation over year on
year
Liquidity
06/10/2011 APF extended to £275 billion. APF/QE2
09/02/2012 APF extended to £325 billion. APF/QE2
05/07/2012 APF extended to £375 billion. APF/QE2
13/07/2012 The Bank and Treasury launch the Funding for Lending Scheme
(FLS).
FLS
12/09/2012 Extension of swap facility agreement with ECB Liquidity
24/04/2013 Extension of the FLS until January 2015 FLS
07/08/2013 The BoE "expects not to raise Bank Rate from 0,5% at least until
unemployment falls below 7%"
FG
16/09/2013 Extension of the swap facility agreement with the BOE/ECB Liquidity
28/11/2013 The Bank and Treasury re-focus the FLS to support business lend-
ing in 2014
FLS
Continued on next page
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Table C.11 – Continued from previous page
Date Announcement Measure
09/01/2014 "Members therefore saw no immediate need to raise Bank Rate
even if the 7% unemployment threshold were to be reached in the
near future"
FG
16/01/2014 The BOE launched a new regular market-wide Indexed Long-
Term Repo (ILTR) operation
Liquidity
12/02/2014 "Despite the sharp fall in unemployment there remains scope to
absorb spare capacity further before raising Bank Rate" and the
"path of Bank Rate over the next few years will, however, depend
on economic developments".
FG
12/06/2014 Widening access to the Sterling Monetary Framework broker-
dealers and central counterparties
Liquidity
05/11/2014 Widening access to the Sterling Monetary Framework broker-
dealers and central counterparties
Liquidity
02/12/2014 BOE and Treasury announce extension to the FLS FLS
30/11/2015 BOE and Treasury announce a two-year extension to the FLS FLS
23/06/2016 Brexit vote. Brexit
04/08/2016 Introduction of a Term Funding Scheme, the purchase of non-
financial investment-grade corporate bonds of up to £10 billion
(CBPS) and increase the stock of purchased UK government
bonds by £60 billion to a total of £435 billion. (APF 3)
APF/QE3
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 61 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2127
Table C.12: Dates of UMP measures for Bank of Japan
Date Announcement Measure
12/12/2007 Reciprocal currency agreements, announced by five central banks Liquidity
14/10/2018 Measures to improve liquidity in the JGB repo market and expan-
sion of US dollar funds supplying operations
Liquidity
31/10/2008 Complementary deposit facility Liquidity
02/12/2008 Special Fund Supplying Operation SFSO
19/12/2008 Increase JGB purchases JGB/CFI purchases
22/01/2009 Purchase up to 3 trillion yen in commercial paper and ABCP. Out-
right purchases (CPs, corp bonds)
JGB/CFI purchases
19/02/2009 Expansion of Special Funds-Supplying Operations and details on
corporate bonds
JGB/CFI purchases
18/03/2009 Increase of outright purchases of Japanese government bonds
(from 16.8 trillion yen per year to 21.6 trillion yen per year
JGB/CFI purchases
26/06/2009 Extension of temporary reciprocal currency arrangements Liquidity
15/07/2009 Extension of commercial paper. JGB/CFI purchases
14/10/2009 Amendment to "Guidelines on Eligible Collateral" Liquidity
30/10/2009 Extension of the programme. SFSO
01/12/2009 New funds-supplying operation (offer 10 trillion yen in 3month
loans)
FRO
18/12/2009 Clarification of the "Understanding of Medium- to Long-Term
Price Stability"
FG
17/03/2010 Expansion of the size of fixed-rate funds supplying operations to
20 trillion yen
FRO
21/05/2010 Preliminary framework for the fund provisioning measure to fa-
cilitate strengthening of the foundations for economic growth
Fund-Provisioning. GSFF (offer 3 trillion yen in 1-year loans
GSFF
15/06/2010 Information about GSFF GSFF
30/08/2010 Introduction of a six-month term in the fixed-rate funds-supplying
operation (10 additional trillion)
FRO
05/10/2010 Announcement of Comprehensive monetary easing CME
05/11/2010 Details of purchases of ETFs and J-REITs CME
21/12/2010 Extension of temporary US dollar liquidity swap arrangements Liquidity
14/03/2011 APP extended by about 5 trillion yen to 40tr CME
Continued on next page
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Table C.12 – Continued from previous page
Date Announcement Measure
28/04/2011 Outline for the Funds-Supplying Operation to Support Financial
Institutions in Disaster Areas
Liquidity
14/06/2011 GSFF. Expand another 0.5 trillion loans GSFF
04/08/2011 APP extended by about 10 trillion yen to 50tr CME
27/10/2011 APP extended by about 5 trillion yen to 55tr. JGB CME
14/02/2012 APP extended by about 10 trillion yen to 65tr CME
13/03/2012 GSFF- increase by 2 trillion yen from 3.5 tr yen to 5.5 GSFF
10/04/2012 A New U.S. Dollar Lending Arrangement Established as part
of the "Fund-Provisioning Measure to Support Strengthening the
Foundations for Economic Growth"
Liquidity
27/04/2012 APP extended by about 5 trillion yen to 70tr CME
19/09/2012 APP extended by about 10 trillion yen to 80tr CME
05/10/2012 Amendment on collateral Liquidity
30/10/2012 APP extended y about 11 trillion yen to 91tr CME
20/12/2012 APP extended by about 10 trillion yen to 101tr CME
22/01/2013 Introduction of the price stability target and the open-ended asset
purchasing method. APP extended to 13tr monthly
CME
04/04/2013 Introduction of the QQE. Purchase of different kinds of assets,
targeting a doubling of the monetary base by 2014.
QQE
18/02/2014 Double GSFF and SBLF and extend their applications one year GSFF/ SBLF
11/03/2014 Changes for the loan support programme Liquidity
21/05/2014 (QQE) has been exerting its intended effects, and the Bank will
continue with it, aiming to achieve the price stability target of 2
percent, as long as it is necessary for maintaining that target in a
stable manner"
FG
31/10/2014 QQE expansion: accelerating JGB’s purchase, extending its aver-
age remaining maturity and triple ETF and JREIT purchase
QQE
19/11/2014 QQE: the monetary base will
increase at an annual pace of about 80 trillion yen.
QQE
21/01/2015 Extension of GSFF and SBLF and FRO for disaster for 1 year and
increase of the amount to GSFF
GSFF/ SBLF
20/03/2015 Changes to securities lending facility Liquidity
Continued on next page
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Table C.12 – Continued from previous page
Date Announcement Measure
19/06/2015 New Framework for Monetary Policy Meetings: release and
transparency
FG
07/10/2015 Amendment on eligible collateral Liquidity
18/12/2015 QQE: extend the average maturity of JGB purchases and broaden
the type of assets eligible to serve as collateral for central bank
loans
QQE
29/01/2016 QQEnir: Apply a negative interest rate of minus 0,1 percent to
part of the accounts that institutions hold at the Bank
QQEwnir
15/03/2016 Details on QQE with Negative Interest Rates operations QQEwnir
11/04/2016 QQEnir:increase the ration applied to the portion of deposits ex-
empt from negative rates to 2,5 percent from the initial zero
QQEwnir
28/04/2016 ETF increase in purchases up to 3.3tr/years QQEwnir
29/07/2016 Increase ETF purchases up to 6tr/year and extend liquidity mea-
sures
QQEwnir
21/09/2016 QQE with Yield Curve Control scheme introduction. QQEwYCC
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Appendix D. Macroeconomic data releases
Table D.13: Macroeconomic data releases used in event-study. Notes: Sample period from January 2007 to
December 2016. These are the indicators included in the event-study to control for relevant macroeconomic
releases that can affect market players’ perceptions. In the case of the US, UK and Japan, we only include
the variables affecting this country, while for the Eurozone, we have chosen the most relevant indicators of




US New home sales
US Existing home sales
US Retail sales





US Consumer Price Index (CPI)
US Gross Domestic Product
US Industrial Production
Euro area Consumer confidence. Euro Area
Euro area CPI MoM. Euro Area
Euro area Economic confidence. Euro Area
Euro area GDP SA QoQ. Euro Area
Euro area Industrial Production SA MoM. Euro Area
Euro area Consumer confidence. France
Euro area CPI YoY. France
Euro area GDP QoQ. France
Euro area Industrial Production MoM. France
Euro area CPI MoM. Germany
Euro area GDP SA QoQ. Germany
Euro area IFO Business Climate. Germany
Euro area Industrial Production SA MoM. Germany
Euro area Unemployment rate. Germany
Continued on next page
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Table D.13 – Continued from previous page
Area Variable
Euro area ZEW Survey Expectations. Germany
Euro area CPI EU Harmonised YoY. Italy
Euro area GDP WDA QoQ. Italy
Euro area Industrial Production MoM. Italy
Euro area GDP QoQ. Spain
Euro area Unemployment rate. Spain
Euro area CPI EU Harmonised YoY. Spain
UK Consumer confidence
UK Consumer Price Index (CPI)
UK Gross Domestic Product





Japan Consumer Confidence Index




Japan Gross Domestic Product
Japan Retail Trade
Japan Housing Starts
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Appendix E. Event study. Additional checks.
Appendix E.1. Two-day window
Table E.14: UMP announcements and option-implied tail risks in the short run. Two-day window
















UMP -0.02 -0.08* -0.04*** -0.13*** -0.04** -0.09 0 -0.03
[0.017] [0.044] [0.017] [0.041] [0.019] [0.071] [0.018] [0.055]
News 0 -0.02** 0 0 -0.01** -0.03** -0.01 -0.02
[0.003] [0.010] [0.003] [0.008] [0.005] [0.016] [0.008] [0.028]
Observations 2,517 2,517 2,540 2,540 2,552 2,552 2,446 2,446
Notes: The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2016. The dependent variable refers to the change in a two-day window
in the option-implied probability of a τ = -5;-10 percent decrease in the S&P500, the EuroStoxx 50, the FTSE 100 and the Nikkei 225
for a period of 1 month. UMP is a dummy variable that captures the announcement dates of major unconventional monetary policies in
each area, including liquidity measures. Further details about the list of events included are provided in Appendix C. “News” controls
for relevant macro releases in each area; see D.13 for more information. UMP in the rest of the areas are also controlled for. Newey
West standard errors in brackets and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table E.15: UMP and option-implied tail risks across different horizons. Two-day window
















1-month -0.02 -0.08* -0.04*** -0.13*** -0.04** -0.11* 0 -0.03
[0.017] [0.044] [0.017] [0.041] [0.019] [0.067] [0.018] [0.055]
2-month -0.01 -0.03 -0.01 -0.04* -0.03** -0.04* 0 -0.01
[0.009] [0.019] [0.013] [0.022] [0.010] [0.023] [0.014] [0.026]
3-month -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02** -0.03** 0.01 0.01
[0.007] [0.012] [0.014] [0.019] [0.008] [0.015] [0.015] [0.021]
Observations 2,517 2,517 2,540 2,540 2,552 2,552 2,446 2,4476
Notes: The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2016. The dependent variable refers to the change in a two-day window
in the option-implied probability of a τ = -5;-10 percent decline in the S&P500, the EuroStoxx 50, the FTSE 100 and the Nikkei 225
for a period t = 1 , 2 or 3 months. UMP is a dummy variable that captures the announcement dates of major unconventional monetary
policies in each area, including liquidity measures. Further details are provided in Appendix C. In all the regressions, other relevant
macroeconomic releases (“News”) and other UMP announcements in other areas have been controlled for, even if not reported in this
table. Newey-West standard errors in brackets, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix E.2. Details of disaggregated Event-Study Analysis












Liquidity -0.04 -0.09** -0.03* -0.05*** -0.02 -0.04**
[0.024] [0.037] [0.020] [0.020] [0.015] [0.018]
LSAP1 -0.03 -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
[0.029] [0.034] [0.015] [0.018] [0.015] [0.016]
LSAP2 -0.05*** -0.15*** -0.03*** -0.05*** -0.02*** -0.04***
[0.006] [0.020] [0.002] [0.015] [0.004] [0.007]
LSAP3 -0.01 -0.09 0 -0.02 0 -0.01
[0.010] [0.072] [0.007] [0.025] [0.005] [0.010]
MEP 0.02 -0.03 0.02*** 0.03 0.02*** 0.02*
[0.017] [0.107] [0.002] [0.024] [0.001] [0.013]
FG -0.09*** -0.27*** -0.05*** -0.11*** -0.03*** -0.07***
[0.013] [0.051] [0.006] [0.015] [0.004] [0.009]
News 0 -0.01* 0 0 0 0
[0.002] [0.007] [0.001] [0.003] [0.001] [0.002]
Observations 2,517 2,517 2,517 2,517 2,517 2,517
Notes: The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2016. The dependent variable refers to the daily change in the option-
implied probability of a τ = -5;-10 percent decline in the S&P500 for a period of n = 1 , 2 or 3 months. LSAP1, LSAP2, LSAP3, MEP
and FG represent the announcements dates related to these programs. More details about the list of events included are provided in
Appendix C. “News” controls for relevant macro releases in the US; see D.13 for more information. UMP in the rest of the areas are
also controlled for. Newey-West standard errors in brackets and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Liquidity -0.04** -0.09** -0.02** -0.04** -0.02 -0.03*
[0.014] [0.037] [0.010] [0.018] [0.010] [0.015]
CBBP/ABSPP 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.02
[0.027] [0.070] [0.017] [0.034] [0.016] [0.026]
SMP 0.01 0.02 0 0 0.01 0
[0.045] [0.100] [0.032] [0.064] [0.024] [0.049]
OMT 0.02 -0.03 0.06*** 0.05*** 0.08*** 0.08***
[0.015] [0.048] [0.007] [0.017] [0.007] [0.011]
APP -0.06** -0.13*** -0.03* -0.05* -0.03 -0.03
[0.023] [0.052] [0.017] [0.027] [0.018] [0.024]
FG -0.03** -0.11*** -0.01 -0.03 0 -0.01
[0.013] [0.036] [0.015] [0.021] [0.015] [0.020]
News 0 0 0 0 0 0
[0.002] [0.005] [0.002] [0.003] [0.002] [0.002]
Observations 2541 2541 2541 2541 2541 2541
Notes: The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2016. The dependent variable refers to the daily change in the option-
implied probability of a τ = -5;-10 percent decline in the EuroStoxx 50 for a period of n = 1 , 2 or 3 months. Liquidity captures the
announcement dates of LTRO, TLTRO, COLL, FOR and FRTFA measures, and the rest of variables includes the related releases. More
details about the list of events included are provided in Appendix C. “News” controls for relevant macro releases in the euro area;
see D.13 for more information. UMP in the rest of the areas are also controlled for. Newey-West standard errors in brackets and ***
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1












FLS -0.02 -0.11 0 -0.01 0.01 0
[0.027] [0.109] [0.015] [0.034] [0.013] [0.019]
APF1 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.02
[0.023] [0.059] [0.021] [0.035] [0.020] [0.028]
APF2 -0.03*** -0.06*** -0.02*** -0.03*** -0.02*** -0.03***
[0.008] [0.023] [0.004] [0.007] [0.007] [0.005]
APF3 -0.15 -0.56*** -0.05 -0.17 -0.03 -0.07
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
FG -0.05*** -0.10*** -0.05** -0.06* -0.05** -0.06**
[0.017] [0.024] [0.021] [0.030] [0.019] [0.028]
Liquidity -0.04*** -0.09** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.02*** -0.03***
[0.011] [0.034] [0.006] [0.013] [0.007] [0.009]
Brexit -0.05 -0.18 0.05 0 0.01 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
News -0.01** -0.03*** 0 -0.01 0 0
[0.003] [0.011] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002] [0.003]
Observations 2,552 2,552 2,552 2,552 2,552 2,552
Notes: The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2016. The dependent variable refers to the daily change in the option-
implied probability of a τ = -5;-10 percent decrease in the FTSE 100 for a period of n = 1 , 2 or 3 months. More details about the list of
events included are provided in Appendix C. “News” controls for relevant macro releases in the UK; see D.13 for more information.
UMP in the rest of the areas are also controlled for. Newey-West standard errors in brackets and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Liquidity -0.04*** -0.06** -0.01 -0.03** 0.01 0
[0.014] [0.027] [0.020] [0.015] [0.021] [0.018]
QQE -0.03 0 -0.01 0 -0.01 -0.02
[0.052] [0.102] [0.034] [0.063] [0.020] [0.027]
QQEwNIR -0.02 -0.09** 0 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
[0.020] [0.035] [0.014] [0.020] [0.013] [0.012]
QQEwYCC -0.11 -0.7 -0.06 -0.14 -0.07 -0.09
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
CME 0 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
[0.034] [0.140] [0.018] [0.049] [0.019] [0.029]
JGB/CFIpurchases 0.02 -0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
[0.044] [0.040] [0.051] [0.048] [0.038] [0.041]
FG -0.10*** -0.27*** -0.03 -0.09** -0.02 -0.05
[0.018] [0.040] [0.020] [0.040] [0.024] [0.033]
News 0 -0.02 0 0 0.01 0.01
[0.007] [0.022] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.006]
Observations 2,447 2,447 2,447 2,447 2,447 2,447
Notes: The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2016. The dependent variable refers to the daily change in the option-
implied probability of a τ = -5;-10 percent decline in the Nikkei 225 for a period of n = 1 , 2 or 3 months. Further details about the list
of events included are provided in Appendix C. “News” controls for relevant macro releases in Japan; see D.13 for more information.
UMP in the rest of the areas are also controlled for. Newey West standard errors in brackets and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix E.3. Controlling for liquidity risks
Liquidity issues might be a source of concern in option markets. That is why, we use
the most liquid index options, such as SP500, Eurostoxx 50, FTSE 100 and Nikkei225.
In order to control for potential liquidity risks, we run an additional robustness check to
our baseline specification. We calculate the relative bid-ask spread for each region and
use it as a control variable in the event-study analysis. Therefore the event-study in this







γi, jNewsi, j,t +ρiSpreadi,t + εi,t (E.1)
with α = 5%,10% and n = 1,2,3 months and where ΔFα%t,i,n stands for the change in the
expected probability (in logs) of an α% decline in the stock market for a period of n
months for each area i; AUMPi,t is a dummy variable equal to one on the day of the UMP
announcement, zero otherwise; Spread controls for the liquidity risk. The rest of the
specification follows 1.
Table E.20, E.21 and E.22 confirm the results of our baseline specification. 22
Table E.20: UMP announcements and option-implied tail risks in the short run. Liquidity control
















UMP -0.05*** -0.15*** -0.04*** -0.10*** -0.04*** -0.10*** -0.03*** -0.07*
[0.012] [0.034] [0.011] [0.028] [0.009] [0.030] [0.012] [0.042]
News -0.00 -0.02** -0.00* -0.01 -0.01*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.02
[0.003] [0.010] [0.003] [0.006] [0.004] [0.012] [0.007] [0.017]
Spread 0.01 0.10 0.09** 0.22** 0.09** 0.32** 0.02 0.05
[0.029] [0.085] [0.041] [0.104] [0.043] [0.132] [0.039] [0.137]
Obs. 2,517 2,517 2,541 2,541 2,552 2,552 1,885 1,885
Notes: The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2016, except for the case of Japan that it starts from mid-2009. The
dependent variable refers to the daily change in the option-implied probability of a 5% and 10% decrease in the S&P500, the EuroStoxx
50, the FTSE 100 and the Nikkei 225 for a period t = 1 month. UMP is a dummy variable that captures the announcement dates of
major unconventional monetary policies in each area, including liquidity measures. Further details about the list of events included are
provided in Appendix C. “News” controls for relevant macro releases in each area and “spread” for liquidity risk. UMP announcements
in the rest of the areas are also controlled for. Newey-West standard errors in brackets, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
22The spillovers effects are also robust to this new specification. Results can be provided upon request.
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Table E.21: UMP and option-implied tail risks across different horizons: Liquidity control
















1-month -0.05*** -0.15*** -0.04*** -0.10*** -0.04*** -0.10*** -0.03*** -0.07*
[0.012] [0.034] [0.011] [0.028] [0.009] [0.030] [0.012] [0.042]
2-month -0.03*** -0.06*** -0.02** -0.04** -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.03**
[0.007] [0.013] [0.008] [0.014] [0.006] [0.011] [0.008] [0.015]
3-month -0.02*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.02* -0.02*** -0.03*** 0.00 -0.02
[0.005] [0.009] [0.009] [0.012] [0.006] [0.008] [0.012] [0.010]
Obs. 2,517 2,517 2,541 2,541 2,552 2,552 1,885 1,885
Notes: The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2016, except for the case of Japan thaat it starts from mid-2009. The
dependent variable refers to the daily change in the option-implied probability of a 5% and 10% decline in the S&P500, the EuroStoxx
50, the FTSE 100 and the Nikkei 225 for a period t = 1, 2 or 3 months. UMP is a dummy variable that captures the announcement dates
of major unconventional monetary policies in each area, including liquidity measures. Further details about the list of events included
are provided in Appendix C. In all the regressions, other relevant macroeconomic releases (“News”), liquidity controls (“Spread”) and
other UMP announcements in other areas have been controlled for, even if not reported in this table. Newey-West standard errors in
brackets, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table E.22: Heterogeneous UMP and option-implied tail risks in the short run. Liquidity control
















Liquidity -0.04 -0.09*** -0.04** -0.09** -0.04*** -0.11*** -0.03*** -0.05
[0.024] [0.036] [0.014] [0.038] [0.011] [0.036] [0.011] [0.034]
Sterilized AP 0.02 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.00 0.01
[0.017] [0.110] [0.020] [0.050] [0.015] [0.021]
Unsterilized AP -0.03** -0.09*** -0.04** -0.09* -0.04 -0.11 -0.02 -0.04
[0.014] [0.029] [0.020] [0.048] [0.024] [0.079] [0.021] [0.081]
FG -0.09*** -0.27*** -0.04*** -0.14*** -0.06*** -0.11*** -0.10*** -0.27***
[0.012] [0.051] [0.014] [0.030] [0.017] [0.024] [0.018] [0.040]
News -0.00 -0.02** -0.00* -0.01 -0.01*** -0.04*** -0.01 -0.02
[0.003] [0.010] [0.003] [0.006] [0.004] [0.012] [0.007] [0.017]
Spread 0.00 0.09 0.09** 0.22** 0.09** 0.32** 0.02 0.05
[0.029] [0.085] [0.041] [0.105] [0.043] [0.133] [0.039] [0.137]
Observations 2517 2517 2541 2541 2552 2552 1,885 1,885
Notes: The sample period is from January 2007 to December 2016, except for the case of Japan that it starts from mid-2009. The
dependent variable refers to the daily change in the option-implied probability of a 5% and 10% decline in the S&P500, the EuroStoxx
50, the FTSE 100 and the Nikkei 225 for a period t = 1, 2 or 3 months. UMP announcements are disaggregated into liquidity, sterilized
asset purchases, unsterilized asset purchases and forward guidance. Further details about the list of events included are provided in
Appendix C. “News” controls for relevant macro releases in each area and “Spread” for liquidity risk. UMP announcements in the rest
of the areas are also controlled for. Newey-West standard errors in brackets, and *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Appendix F. Additional results of SVAR & Robustness checks.
Appendix F.1. Baseline results for each area
Figure F.9: Fed baseline results
Impulse-responses functions (IRFs) from SVARmodels to UMP, demand, supply and uncertainty shocks, identified by sign and zero restrictions
summarized in 5. The figure F.9 depicts the response of the economic variables under study to a one-standard-deviation shock. Each row
corresponds to an economic variable, and the different shocks identified (UMP, demand, supply and uncertainty) are organized in columns.
Each chart displays the median of the posterior distribution (solid line), and the 68 percent credibility interval (shaded area).
BANCO DE ESPAÑA 73 DOCUMENTO DE TRABAJO N.º 2127
Figure F.10: ECB baseline results
Impulse-responses functions (IRFs) from SVAR models to an UMP, a demand, a supply and an uncertainty shock, identified by sign and zero restrictions summarized in 5. The figure F.10
depicts the response of the economic variables under study to a one standard deviation shock. Each row corresponds to an economic variable, and the different shocks identified (UMP,
demand, supply and uncertainty) are organized in columns. Each chart displays the median of the posterior distribution (solid line), and the 68 percent credibility interval (shaded area).
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Figure F.11: BOE baseline results
Impulse-responses functions (IRFs) from SVAR models to UMP, demand, supply and uncertainty shocks, identified by sign and zero restrictions summarized in 5. Figure F.11 depicts the response
of the economic variables under study to a one-standard-deviation shock. Each row corresponds to an economic variable, and the different shocks identified (UMP, demand, supply and uncertainty)
are organized in columns. Each chart displays the median of the posterior distribution (solid line), and the 68 percent credibility interval (shaded area).
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Figure F.12: BOJ baseline results
Impulse-responses functions (IRFs) from SVAR models to UMP, demand, supply and uncertainty shocks, identified by sign and zero restrictions summarized in 5. The figure F.12 depicts the
response of the economic variables under study to a-one-standard deviation shock. Each row corresponds to an economic variable, and the different shocks identified (UMP, demand, supply and
uncertainty) are organized in columns. Each chart displays the median of the posterior distribution (solid line), and the 68 percent credibility interval (shaded area).
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